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I. INTRODUCTION
When a physician prescribes a drug or uses a medical device, most
patients would assume that the drug or device has been approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the government agency charged
with protecting consumers from unsafe and fraudulent foods and drugs.1
1. The FDA regulates the safety and efficacy of food, drugs, medical devices,
and cosmetics. This Article focuses on the FDA’s role in regulating the pharmaceutical
industry and the marketing of drugs and devices. The FDA’s mission regarding drugs
and medical devices is described as promoting the public health “by promptly and
efficiently reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of
regulated products in a timely manner” and “ensuring that . . . human and veterinary
drugs are safe and effective.” Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §
393(b) (2012). The FDA derives its authority to regulate drugs and medical devices
from several statutes. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was passed in
1938 after a toxic elixir killed more than 100 people, including many children. See
Efthimios Parasidis, Patients Over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation
of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 937–40. The FDCA requires evidence of
the safety of new drugs before they can be marketed. See Henry A. Waxman, A History
of Adverse Drug Experiences: Congress Had Ample Evidence To Support Restrictions
on the Promotion of Prescription Drugs, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 299, 299 (2003). The
Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 required that drugs be proven not only safe but
effective. Id. at 300. The FDA conducted a Drug Efficacy Implementation Study to
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When the FDA approves a drug or device and its label, it does so for a
particular use, or indication.2 Frequently, however, a physician may
prescribe a drug or use a device for something other than the FDA
approved indication. Such practices are not illegal because the FDA
does not regulate the practice of medicine.3 If a physician prescribes a
drug for an indication that has not been approved by the FDA, or for a
dosage different than that approved by the FDA, the prescription is often
referred to as “off-label.”4 Off-label prescribing by physicians is completely
different from off-label marketing by pharmaceutical companies. Although
patients may trust the judgment of their physicians to make prescribing
decisions about off-label use, the promotion of drugs for off-label use
raises controversial questions.5
The FDA discourages off-label promotion because the practice allows
manufacturers to evade scientific evaluation of safety and efficacy.
Representative Henry A. Waxman emphasizes that Congress has passed
laws and regulations regulating information about drugs because without
such regulations history has shown that “deceptive, unsubstantiated
claims about health-related products proliferate, at a tremendous cost in
human lives.”6 Although companies maintain that the information they
provide physicians is truthful, it is likely that they do not provide the

review pre-1962 drug claims and found that one-third of all drugs on the market “could
not be shown to be effective for a single indication and had to be taken off the market.”
Id. at 304. The drugs included some of the most widely promoted and best selling drugs.
Id. The Medical Device Amendments (MDA), added in 1976, regulate the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–360n-1 (2012)). The MDA
responded to findings that faulty medical devices have caused numerous injuries and
deaths. S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 6 (1975).
2. When the FDA approves a new drug, the approval only extends to the
conditions indicated on the FDA-approved labeling. The FDA considers any alterations
of the label, including recommending or suggesting a new use for the drug, to be a “new
drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2012). If the manufacturer seeks to introduce the drug into
interstate commerce for a new use, it must seek and obtain FDA approval for that new
use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
3. The FDCA states, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate
health care practitioner-patient relationship.” 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012).
4. See Jane E. Henney, Safeguarding Patient Welfare: Who’s in Charge?, 145
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 305, 305 (2006).
5. See infra note 28.
6. Waxman, supra note 1, at 299.
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whole truth and that information is frequently presented in a manner that
is inherently fraudulent or misleading.7 Furthermore, the government
maintains that a physician’s decision to prescribe a drug for an off-label
use should not be influenced by a marketing campaign orchestrated to
impact the physician’s decision. Following a settlement with Eli Lilly in
connection with both criminal and civil charges for off-label promotion
of its drug Zyprexa, a U.S. Attorney stated that by ignoring the
government’s process for drug approval, companies “undermine the
integrity of the doctor-patient relationship . . . . People have an absolute
right to their doctor’s medical expertise, and to know that their health
care provider’s judgment has not been clouded by misinformation from a
company trying to build its bottom line.”8
Despite FDA concerns, off-label marketing has been described as “so
common among drug and device makers that it’s often dismissed as the
equivalent of driving slightly over the speed limit.”9 In fact, studies suggest
that more than twenty percent of prescriptions are written for off-label
uses.10 Pharmaceutical companies and their supporters emphasize the
benefits of off-label prescribing and the need for off-label promotion.11
Advantages of off-label prescription include delivery of needed new
treatments sooner rather than at the end of a lengthy and costly approval
process.12 Supporters also maintain that off-label promotion allows the
company, which has the most complete information about the product, to
give accurate, timely information to physicians.13 Although off-label
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay
$1.415 Billion To Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html. Zyprexa
was approved for use with certain psychotic disorders such as Bipolar I Disorder and
schizophrenia. Eli Lilly marketed it to primary care physicians in nursing homes and
assisted living facilities for unapproved uses such as treating dementia, Alzheimer’s
dementia, depression, anxiety, and sleep problems, as well as behavioral symptoms such
as agitation, aggression, and hostility. The information also alleges that building on its
unlawful promotion and success in the long-term care market, Eli Lilly executives
decided to market Zyprexa to primary care physicians. In October 2000, Eli Lilly began
an off-label marketing campaign targeting primary care physicians, even though the
company knew that there was virtually no approved use for Zyprexa in the primary care
market. Eli Lilly trained its primary care physician sales representatives to promote
Zyprexa by focusing on symptoms, rather than Zyprexa’s FDA-approved indications. Id.
9. Mina Kimes, Bad to the Bone, FORTUNE, Oct. 8, 2012, at 140.
10. See Henney, supra note 4, at 305; David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006).
11. See infra note 368 and accompanying text.
12. See John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on
Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L.
& ETHICS 299, 305–06 (2010).
13. See id.
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prescription may be a medically sound option for many physicians, offlabel promotion carries substantial risks. The following example illustrates
some of those risks.
The FDA approved a medical “bone cement” for use in arm and skull
surgeries.14 The product, Norian XR, filled fractures and essentially became
part of the bone.15 The manufacturer of the product sought to use it in
other types of surgeries, such as vertical compression fractures of the
spine (VCFs).16 Spurred on by the knowledge that Americans suffer
some 500,000 VCFs a year, as well as research that indicated surgeons’
interest in such a product, the company tested the product in various
ways, including clinical trials that did not have the FDA’s approval.17
The FDA was concerned about use of the product in connection with
spinal fractures because the bone cement could leak into the numerous
arteries in the spine, causing severe and fatal clotting.18 The label approved
by the FDA on the product cautioned against use in surgeries for
VCFs.19
Despite warnings from the FDA, Norian and its parent company,
Synthes, made a calculated decision to promote the use of the product
off-label for VCFs.20 At least five people died of pulmonary clots shortly
after the bone cement was injected during spine surgery.21 One physician
whose patient died on the operating table stated that the sales
representative had pushed the product and that he was not clear about the
product’s status on the market.22 His partner, however, believed the
product was safe and effective, and continued to use it; he subsequently
lost a patient during surgery.23 Ultimately, use of the product for VCFs

14. Kimes, supra note 9, at 144.
15. Id. at 142.
16. Id. at 144.
17. Id.
18. Before the company began marketing the product for use in VCFs, tests
showed that the bone cement caused blood clots when mixed with human blood. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Executives of International Medical Device
Maker Sentenced to Prison in Unlawful Clinical Trials Case (Nov. 21, 2011), available
at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm280937.htm. Tests of the product
on pigs also showed that clots formed in the lungs. Id.
19. Kimes, supra note 9, at 144–45.
20. Id. at 144.
21. Id. at 142.
22. Id. at 150.
23. Id.
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was halted.24 Both Synthes and Norian pled guilty to numerous
misdemeanors and paid substantial fines.25 Four executives were charged
as “responsible corporate officers.”26 They pled guilty to one
misdemeanor count of shipping adulterated and misbranded Norian XR
in interstate commerce and were sentenced to several months in jail.27
The outrageous facts of this case demonstrate the extreme harm that
can result from off-label promotion of drugs.28 But the case illustrates
several points that are critical to the debate about off-label promotion
even in cases that are less tragic. First, the company was willing to
overlook serious risks associated with its product to reach a large, lucrative
market.29 Second, the case demonstrates the misconception that because
a drug is approved for one use, it must be safe for other uses.30 As the
Norian case illustrates, a product can be safe and effective for some uses
and excessively risky for others.31 Third, the company chose to avoid
the time-consuming and expensive FDA approval process to get its
product to market quickly.32 Fourth, surgeons were led to believe the
product was safe and were not fully informed of the risks associated with
the product.33 Fifth, patients were unaware that they were the victims of
experimentation.34
The case also demonstrates that courts are inaccurate in assuming that
doctors, as “learned intermediaries,” can successfully safeguard their
patients from the aggressive marketing strategies of pharmaceutical
24. Id. Not only did the company continue to market the product until after the
third death it also failed to report details of the deaths to the FDA as required. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 8.
25. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 8.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The dangers associated with off-label promotion are numerous. For some
examples of serious health issues associated with off-label promotion and use, see Aaron
S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals and
Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 226 (2011), which details individual
patient risks and the risks to the health care system.
29. See Kimes, supra note 9, at 144.
30. Id. at 149.
31. Id. at 142.
32. FDA approval of medical devices is governed by the FDCA as amended by
the MDA. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–360n-1 (2012). Although some devices require a
premarket approval application before they may be marketed to the public, a
manufacturer may seek an Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) to conduct tests on
human subjects without premarket approval. See id. § 360j(g). The IDE is designed to
“encourage . . . the discovery and development of useful devices . . . [and] to maintain
optimum freedom for scientific investigators.” Id. The manufacturer of Norian, however,
opted not to seek an IDE. See Kimes, supra note 9, at 146.
33. Id. at 149.
34. Id. at 142.
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companies.35 The medical literature is replete with information about
the impact that pharmaceutical companies have on doctors’ decisions
and prescribing habits and the inability of doctors to discern truthful
from false or misleading information.36
In response to an increase in government prosecution of cases involving
off-label promotion, the industry has complained that such prosecutions
are overly aggressive.37 It is more likely, however, that the government
has responded appropriately to increasingly aggressive marketing strategies
that put patients at risk. The off-label promotion of Neurontin provides
an example of the calculated and extensive marketing strategies a company
might employ.38 Approved for use in conjunction with other drugs to

35. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
36. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
37. See Osborn, supra note 13, at 301 (describing the American pharmaceutical
industry as “under siege” and referring to government investigations as “intrusive”). For
a list of cases settled between 2004 and 2011 involving off-label promotion by
pharmaceutical companies, see List of Off-Label Promotion Pharmaceutical Settlements,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_off-label_promotion_pharmaceutical_
settlements (last modified Aug. 9, 2014). The healthcare advocacy group Public Citizen
reported that between November 2, 2010, and July 18, 2012, there were seventy-four
civil and criminal judgments and settlements against pharmaceutical companies, totaling
$10.2 billion. SAMMY ALMASHAT & SIDNEY WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN, PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY C RIMINAL AND C IVIL P ENALTIES : A N U PDATE 4 (2012), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/20731.pdf. Not all of the settlements involved unlawful
promotion, although seven of the top ten did. See Eric Palmer, 10 Largest Settlements
and Judgments, FIERCEPHARMA (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/10largest-settlements-and-judgments/2012-10-17; see also Erika Kelton, Off-Label Pharma
Prosecutions Won’t Be Silenced by First Amendment Decision, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2013,
1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2013/01/04/off-label-pharma-prosecutionswont-be-silenced-by-first-amendment-decision/ (urging the U.S. Department of Justice
to continue prosecutions of off-label marketing after a U.S. court of appeals found a
particular prosecution violated free speech rights).
38. See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 (D.
Mass. 2001). Pfizer acquired Warner Lambert, including its pharmaceutical division,
Parke-Davis, in 2000. 2000: Pfizer Joins Forces with Warner-Lambert, PFIZER.COM,
http://www.pfizer.com/about/history/pfizer_warner_lambert (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
Pfizer maintains that the activity in question took place before its acquisition. See
Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical
Products, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 58 n.93 (2005). Each of the companies was named
as a defendant in the suit. Id. For a more detailed description of the issues involved in
the case, see generally id. at 58–64. Pfizer paid $430 million to settle the suit brought by
the U.S. Department of Justice. Id. at 64. In subsequent litigation, Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals sued Pfizer, claiming that the off-label
promotion of Neurontin caused them to purchase Neurontin for off-label indications such
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treat epilepsy and for dosages ranging between 900 to 1800 milligrams
per day, Parke-Davis marketed the drug for off-label uses including
bipolar disorder, pain, and migraines, and for dosages exceeding 4800
milligrams per day, without any proof that the drug was safe or effective
for these indications.39 Internal company documents revealed that one
employee referred to Neurontin as “the ‘snake oil’ of the twentieth century.”40
The off-label marketing effort was referred to in Parke-Davis memoranda as
a “strategic swerve” to increase profits from Neurontin.41 Pfizer’s offlabel promotion of Neurontin included delaying the publication of studies
that indicated there was no evidence of Neurontin’s efficacy for the offlabel uses and suppressing, spinning, or neutralizing negative studies.42
The company also engaged in a “publication strategy” to promote the
drug and hired doctors to talk about off-label uses.43 One of the key
components of the marketing strategy was to have sales representatives, or
detailers, promote Neurontin’s off-label uses directly to physicians.44
Taped voicemail messages indicated the scope of the company’s
deliberate attempt to promote off-label uses, without regard for the public’s
health and safety. One senior executive, explaining the “Neurontin push,”
rallied his sales representatives with the following speech:
I want you out there every day selling Neurontin . . . holding their hand, whispering
in their ear—Neurontin for pain, Neurontin for monotherapy, Neurontin for
bipolar, Neurontin for everything . . . . I don’t want to see a single patient

as migraines and bipolar disorder. See Greg Stohr, Pfizer Rejected by Top Court on
Neurontin Marketing Suits, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-12-09/pfizer-rejected-by-top-court-on-neurontin-marketing-suits.html. After
a five-week jury trial, the jury found that Pfizer violated the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with respect to its promotion of Neurontin for off-label
uses of bipolar disorder, migraine, neuropathic pain, and dosages exceeding 1800 milligrams a
day. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-cv-10739PBS, 2011 WL 3852254, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2011). The jury awarded damages of $47
million to Kaiser, which the court trebled pursuant to RICO. Id. Pfizer appealed the
verdict on a causation issue, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the lower court. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d 21, 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2013). Numerous cases against Pfizer for the offlabel promotion of Neurontin are ongoing. See, e.g., Owens v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 02-cv01390-FSH-MAH (D.N.J.).
39. See Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 48–49.
40. In re Neurontin, 2011 WL 3852254, at *8.
41. Id. at *6.
42. See Stephanie Saul, Experts Conclude Pfizer Manipulated Studies, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2008, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/health/research/08
drug.html.
43. In re Neurontin, 2011 WL 3852254, at *1.
44. See id. at *25.
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coming off Neurontin before they’ve been up to at least 4,800 milligrams a
day.45

The Neurontin marketing strategy demonstrates that companies can
infiltrate the marketplace with misleading information on numerous
fronts. Moreover, the Neurontin example shows that such marketing
strategies pay off, perhaps even after paying fines for violating the law.
Lifetime sales for Neurontin, if marketed as approved by the FDA, were
projected to be approximately $500 million.46 Following the company’s
off-label marketing strategy, which began in 1995, projections indicate
that ninety percent of Neurontin prescriptions were for off-label uses and
sales soared from $97.5 million in 1995 to approximately $2.7 billion in
2003.47
Pharmaceutical companies maintain that most cases involving offlabel promotion settle because the risk of being excluded from
participation in federal and state healthcare programs is too great.48
Recently, however, several defendants have asserted that off-label
promotion is speech protected by the First Amendment.49 Two cases in
45. Drug Giant Accused of False Claims, NBC NEWS (July 11, 2003), http://nbc
news.com/id/3079883/ns/dateline_nbc/drug-giant-accused-false-claims (transcribing a July
11, 2003 Dateline interview with David Franklin, a former Warner-Lambert senior executive).
46. In re Neurontin, 2011 WL 3852254, at *6.
47. Julie Schmit, Drugmaker Admitted Fraud, But Sales Flourish, USA TODAY
(Aug. 16, 2004, 11:14 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/
drugs/2004-08-16-neurontin-cover_x.htm.
48. See Katherine A. Helm, Protecting Public Health from Outside the
Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to OffLabel Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 180 (2007)
(“Companies are unwilling to take the risks associated with going to trial, including the
risk of exclusion from participation in federal and state healthcare programs.”). Under
42 U.S.C. section 1320a-7, individuals and entities may be excluded from participating
in Medicare and State healthcare programs if convicted of healthcare fraud. 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7(a)(3) (2012).
49. In 2011, Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment that the First Amendment prohibits FDA regulations that criminalize off-label
promotion of FDA-approved drugs. See Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. United States, No.
11-cv-01820 (Oct. 14, 2011). The complaint maintained that the regulations criminalize
manufacturers’ speech even if it is truthful and non-misleading. Id. at 2. Par Pharmaceutical’s
product, Megace ES, is FDA-approved for the treatment of anorexia, cachexia, or
unexplained, significant weight loss in patients diagnosed with AIDS. Id. at 13–14.
According to Par Pharmaceutical, the company sought to provide truthful information
about the on-label use of Megace to doctors who might prescribe for off-label uses in
treating wasting in cancer and geriatric patients. Id. at 22–26. The company stated that a
“manufacturer cannot be deemed to intend an off-label use merely because the
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which the defendants asserted a First Amendment defense have reached
the U.S. courts of appeals. In United States v. Caronia, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in a 2-1 decision that provisions
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) cannot be interpreted to
prohibit truthful, off-label promotion.50 In United States v. Harkonen,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished per
curiam decision, held that the First Amendment does not protect
fraudulent off-label speech.51 The cases are not incompatible. The
Harkonen decision focuses narrowly on the fraudulent nature of the offlabel promotion and the defendant’s intent to defraud, whereas the
Caronia case focuses more broadly on off-label promotion as protected
speech.52
The pharmaceutical industry’s challenges in Harkonen and Caronia
are the latest of several attempts to loosen the FDA’s control over
various marketing strategies. In previous cases, the industry succeeded
in weakening FDA restrictions on dissemination of off-label promotion
in printed materials and of material presented at continuing medical
education events (CMEs).53 The industry has increasingly sought First
Amendment protection for the speech of pharmaceutical representatives
who promote drugs for off-label uses to doctors through detailing.54
Detailing, the type of promotion at issue in Caronia, involves promoting
drugs and devices to doctors in their offices.55 Detailing is especially
important to off-label promotion because there is no prohibition against
manufacturer sells a drug with knowledge that physicians will prescribe the drug for an
off-label use.” Id. at 32; see also Thomas Sullivan, Par Pharmaceuticals vs. FDA
Calling for Truthful Speech vs. FDA Approved, POL’Y & MED. (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://www.policymed.com/2011/10/phar-pharmaceuticals-vs-fda-calling-for-truthful-speechvs-fda-approved.html (discussing the case). Par Pharmaceutical dropped the suit as part
of a settlement in which it agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge for misbranding the
drug and pay criminal and civil fines. See Kristin Jones, Par Pharmaceutical To Settle OffLabel Charges, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2013, 2:26 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324178904578342492178241564. Allergan, the manufacturer of
Botox, also challenged FDA restrictions on off-label promotion on First Amendment
grounds. See Natasha Singer, Botox Maker’s Suit Cites Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2009, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/business/ media/03drug.html?_
r=0. Allergan dropped its suit as part of its settlement with the government. Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Allergan Agrees To Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million To Resolve
Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox, No. 10-988 (Sept. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/september/10-civ-988.html.
50. 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012).
51. 510 F. App’x 633, 636 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
52. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168; Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633 at 638.
53. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55. See Allison Torres Burtka, Court Strikes Down Law Protecting Doctors’
Prescription Data, TRIAL, July 2007, at 84, 84.
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doctors prescribing FDA-approved drugs for off-label uses and it has
proven to be one of the most impactful ways of changing doctors’
prescribing habits.56
The argument that off-label promotion is protected by the First
Amendment received a boost from two U.S. Supreme Court decisions
that addressed advertising and marketing in the pharmaceutical context.
In 2002, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the Court held
that a law prohibiting pharmacies from advertising that they compounded
specific drugs violated the First Amendment.57 In 2011, the Court held
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. that a Vermont statute prohibiting
pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-identifying information
for marketing purposes violated the First Amendment.58 Language in
these decisions provided ammunition for challenging restrictions on offlabel promotion by detailers.59 This Article questions the reach of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Western States and IMS Health, and
whether the Second Circuit’s reliance on these cases in Caronia is
misplaced.
Part II of this Article explains the laws and regulations that limit offlabel promotion as well as exceptions and safe harbors for off-label
promotion and dissemination of information. It also summarizes cases
that paved the way for the First Amendment challenge in Caronia. Part
III details the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s reasoning
in Caronia and its reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in
Western States and IMS Health. The dissenting opinion in Caronia,
which raises important arguments against the majority’s reasoning, is
summarized. In Part IV, an examination of the relationship between
pharmaceutical representatives and physicians reveals that courts should
not assume that off-label promotion provides valuable information or
that doctors are able to distinguish between misleading and nonmisleading
information. In Part V, the Article summarizes the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Harkonen. The case demonstrates that the government may
have more success focusing on the false or misleading nature of off-label
promotion rather than the more technical charge of misbranding.
Nevertheless, Caronia does not signal a significant change in how the

56.
57.
58.
59.

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002).
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
See infra Part III.B.
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government will view off-label promotion. The errors in the prosecution
of Caronia can be easily rectified. Moreover, contrary to the decision in
Caronia, courts should recognize that regulations prohibiting off-label
promotion withstand constitutional scrutiny. This Article argues that
off-label promotion is more appropriately characterized as speech that
does not deserve First Amendment protection because it is inherently
misleading. Furthermore, even if restrictions of off-label promotion are
subjected to First Amendment analysis, the heightened scrutiny standard
used in IMS Health does not apply and the restrictions easily survive
Central Hudson analysis.60 The Article concludes that the government
should not be deterred from prosecuting companies and sales
representatives who promote drugs for off-label uses or by the industry’s
attempt to use the First Amendment as a shield to protect itself from
fraudulent and deceptive marketing techniques.
II. THE PARAMETERS OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION: RULES,
REGULATIONS, AND COURT DECISIONS
Regulations related to prohibiting off-label promotion of drugs require
a balancing of important goals: ensuring that the medical community has
timely and accurate information about new advances in science and
protecting the public health through the FDA’s premarket approval process.
Rules and regulations, as well as interpretations by courts, should seek to
encourage the exchange of scientific information while maintaining a
check on promotional information that is more likely to mislead than to
inform. The following subparts provide background information for
understanding the First Amendment challenges to off-label promotion.
A. What Is Off-Label Promotion?
Since 1962, the FDCA has required premarket approval of drugs for
each indicated use before distribution in interstate commerce.61 The
FDA evaluates whether a drug is safe and effective under the conditions
in the proposed labeling and ensures that the labeling is not “false or
misleading in any particular.”62 If a company discovers new uses for a
drug, new populations to treat, or new dosages, such uses must be
approved by the FDA; otherwise, they are considered to be off-label.63
60. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
61. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 355(a) (2012). For a history of FDA regulation in
the drug industry, see Helm, supra note 48, at 124–46.
62. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2012).
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Because the FDA approval process is time-consuming and expensive,
drug manufacturers may seek to bypass the approval process by marketing
the drug off-label.64 Such promotion may be a tempting option if a
company seeks to maximize a drug’s potential by reaching a larger, more
lucrative market before the patent expires or to avoid the time, costs, and
risks associated with the trials required for FDA approval. For example,
the government alleged that GlaxoSmithKline promoted its antidepressant
drug Paxil off-label because it promoted the drug to a population that
was not approved by the FDA. 65 The FDA-approved label for Paxil
contained a black box warning, stating that antidepressants may increase
the risk of suicidal thinking in patients under eighteen.66 The government
alleged that the company prepared and distributed misleading articles
about the efficacy of the drug for the under-eighteen population and
failed to make available data from trials that showed such use was not
effective.67 By seeking to introduce a product to an unapproved population
and by providing information that was contrary to the FDA-approved label,
a company would be guilty of misbranding.68 GlaxoSmithKline settled the
lawsuit.69
Although neither the FDCA nor FDA regulations specifically prohibit
off-label promotion, a combination of provisions and regulations indicates
that promoting off-label necessarily leads to illegal activity. The FDCA

64. A New Drug Application to the FDA requires detailed reports of preclinical
and clinical trials demonstrating safety and efficacy and the proposed labeling for the
drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012). The requirements for an Investigational New Drug
Application are set forth at 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2013). The various phases of an
investigation, including initial volunteer studies, controlled clinical studies involving several
hundred patients, and expanded and uncontrolled trials involving several hundred to
several thousands of patients, are described in 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2013); see also Julie
C. Relihan, Note, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An International Approach, 13
B.U. INT’L L.J. 229, 233–49 (1995) (describing the drug approval process); How Drugs
Are Developed and Approved, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/development approvalprocess/
howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved (last updated Feb. 13, 2014) (describing the same).
65. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline To Plead Guilty and
Pay $3 Billion To Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure To Report Safety Data (July 2,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The company also pleaded guilty to misbranding charges related to its
drug Wellbutrin, which was approved for Major Depressive Disorder but marketed offlabel for weight loss, sexual dysfunction, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
Id.
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prohibits introducing a drug into commerce without proper labeling about
its indicated use, a practice referred to as misbranding.70 Because labeling
requirements are construed in a very broad manner, including oral
representations made by pharmaceutical representatives, a representative
who gives information about off-label use to a doctor with the intent that
the drug be distributed in commerce is misbranding the drug.71
Marketing for pharmaceutical products and devices may include
information provided in printed materials and advertisements, but it is
often done through oral communication by sales representatives in a
doctor’s office, a practice referred to as detailing.72 Doctors are a critical
link in the effort to introduce an off-label use. Because the FDA does
not interfere with the practice of medicine, doctors may prescribe FDAapproved drugs for any use. 73 Thus, the restrictions that apply to
pharmaceutical companies regarding off-label promotion do not limit a
doctor’s ability to prescribe drugs for off-label use. Convincing a doctor
to prescribe drugs for off-label uses, then, is an effective route to new
markets without FDA approval. One argument that the industry has used
in support of off-label promotion is that speech that supports a lawful
activity—off-label prescription and use—should not be restricted.74
The government maintains, however, that allowing companies to promote
uses that are not FDA-approved strikes at the very heart of the FDA’s
premarket approval system and jeopardizes the public health.75 The
following subparts summarize the rules and regulations, as well as the
case law, relevant to off-label promotion.

70. A drug is “misbranded” if the manufacturer alters the FDA-approved labeling
to include any false or misleading statement. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2012).
71. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2014) (stating that “intended uses” refers to the
“objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of drugs” and
objective intent may be shown “by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written
statements by such persons or their representatives”); 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2012) (stating
that a drug is misbranded if it does not include adequate directions for use).
72. The Pharma Marketing Glossary, PHARMA MARKETING NETWORK, http://www.
glossary.pharma-mkting.com/detailing.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
73. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) (providing that the FDA does not “limit or interfere
with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe” approved drugs or devices
“for any condition or disease”). The Physicians’ Desk Reference states, “[o]nce a
product has been approved for marketing, a physician may choose to prescribe it for
uses, treatment regimens, or patient populations that are not included in approved
labeling.” PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, Foreword (67th ed. 2013). The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that off-label prescribing “is an accepted and necessary corollary of
the FDA’s mission to regulate.” Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,
350 (2001).
74. See infra Part III.B.
75. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
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B. Rules, Regulations, and Guidance on Information
About Off-Label Promotion
Under the FDCA, pharmaceutical manufacturers may not introduce a
new drug into interstate commerce unless the drug and its label have
secured FDA approval.76 The Act also prohibits the “introduction or
delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device,
tobacco product, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.”77 A drug is
considered misbranded if its label contains misleading information, lacks
information that is sufficient to support its safe use for approved
indications, or includes information about unapproved uses.78 A prohibition
on the misbranding of drugs predates the modern FDA. In 1906, the
Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Chemistry regulated drugs under
the Pure Food and Drug Act, which prohibited interstate commerce in
“adulterated” or “misbranded” drugs.79
The definitions of “labeling” and “intended use” further explain how
misbranding charges are related to off-label promotion. The FDCA and
FDA regulations make it clear that labeling includes any printed or oral
statement, including oral statements made by pharmaceutical
representatives. 80 Thus, when pharmaceutical sales representatives
promote a drug for off-label use, it is clear that the information they
provide is considered labeling. The intended use of a drug is determined
by considering the “objective intent of the persons legally responsible for
the labeling of drugs” as evidenced by the “labeling claims, advertising
matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or their
representatives.”81 Thus, when a pharmaceutical representative visits
doctors in their offices and provides information about off-label uses, it
is logical to conclude that the representative’s intent is to introduce a
misbranded drug into commerce. The information provided is labeling
that has not been approved for the intended off-label use. Even though

76. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
77. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012).
78. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 201.50 (2013).
79. Helm, supra note 48, at 125. The Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, §§ 1–
13, 34 Stat. 768, 768–72 (1906) was repealed in 1938.
80. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(k), (m) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2013) (listing the
regulations that govern prescription drug advertising). In Kordel v. United States, the
Court held that a manufacturer may be found guilty of misbranding even though the
product and the labeling information were shipped separately. 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948).
81. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2013).
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the doctor’s off-label prescription is legal, the pharmaceutical company
and its representatives may be prosecuted for misbranding.82 Pharmaceutical
manufacturers and their representatives can face misdemeanor charges
for misbranding or felony charges for fraudulent misbranding.83
Although manufacturers are prohibited from introducing misbranded
drugs into interstate commerce, the FDA has indicated that responding
to unsolicited requests about off-label uses may not indicate intent to
misbrand. In draft guidance published in 2011, the FDA issued nonbinding
recommendations about how companies should respond to both private
and public inquiries about off-label uses from health care professionals
or consumers.84 The FDA’s recommendations respond to the growth of
Internet and social media tools that enable interested parties to seek
information about emerging medical treatments.85 When consumers contact
a company privately about off-label information, the company should
respond privately with “truthful, non-misleading, accurate, and balanced”
scientific information.86 Responses should come from the company’s
medical affairs office, not its sales force, and should be narrowly tailored
to the inquiry.87 Responses should also include a copy of the FDAapproved labeling with a notice that the off-label use has not been approved
by the FDA.88 When inquiries are posted on a public forum, the draft
guidance recommends that a firm should respond in a nonpromotional
manner with contact information only about its own product.89 The FDA
states that if firms follow its suggested recommendations, it will
not “use such responses as evidence of the firm’s intent that the product
be used for an unapproved or uncleared use.”90
In addition to responding to unsolicited inquiries, the FDA has recognized
that pharmaceutical manufacturers may disseminate certain printed material
pertaining to off-label drug uses. In 2009, the agency issued nonbinding
recommendations about the dissemination of off-label information in

82. See Hyman, Phelps & McNamara P.C., A Deep Dive into the Second Circuit’s
Caronia Decision, Potential Next Steps, and Potential Enforcement Fallout, FDA L. BLOG
(Dec. 12, 2012, 1:37 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/12/
a-deep-dive-into-the-second-circuits-caronia-decision-potential-next-steps-and-potential-enforce
ment.html.
83. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2012).
84. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS
FOR OFF-LABEL INFORMATION ABOUT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES (2011)
[hereinafter FDA, 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE].
85. Id. at 3, 10.
86. Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 7, 9, 11.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 12.
90. Id. at 3.
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scientific or medical journals (2009 FDA Guidance).91 The agency
stated that if the recommendations were followed, it would not consider
dissemination of the materials to be evidence of the manufacturer’s intent to
introduce the product for an unapproved use.92 The recommendations
emphasize that materials be peer-reviewed, independent of manufacturer
funding, and not significantly influenced by a financial relationship with
the manufacturer.93 The information should also be based on “scientifically
sound” clinical investigations and not be false or misleading.94
Recommendations also include that the materials be unabridged,
accompanied by the approved labeling, and not attached to promotional
materials.95
The recommendations on disseminating printed materials about offlabel use are substantially less burdensome than previous regulations.96
The FDA’s revised thinking on this issue is largely due to successful

91. FDA, G UIDANCE FOR I NDUSTRY : G OOD R EPRINT P RACTICES FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE
PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR
CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter FDA, 2009 GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/goodreprint.html. The regulations were revised in 2014. See
Revised Draft Guidance for Industry on Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications
on Unapproved New Uses—Recommended Practices, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,793 (Mar. 3,
2014). For purposes of this paper, the information cited in the 2009 FDA Guidance is
substantially similar. The 2014 FDA Draft Guidance recommends that dissemination of
information about studies of unapproved uses meets the following conditions: the study
was conducted by independent researchers; there is adequate substantiation for claims of
safety and efficacy; and the study appears in a peer-reviewed journal. Id. at 11,794–95.
The FDA’s guidelines further suggest that the article be disseminated with the approved
labeling; a comprehensive bibliography; publications that reach contrary results; and
prominent disclosures of the drug’s unapproved status, as well as potential conflicts of
interest—including financial interests of the study’s authors. Id.
92. FDA, 2009 GUIDANCE, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. Id. Despite the FDA’s new tolerance toward the dissemination of materials
about off-label use, the misleading nature of some publications remains controversial.
See, e.g., Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 204–05 (2011) (explaining
that some companies use publication tactics that promote misleading information and calling
for a national registry of all clinical trials to increase transparency).
95. FDA, 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 84.
96. Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(noting that, because of the change in regulations, the plaintiff no longer had a
constitutional objection to the regulations).
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litigation that challenged restrictions on First Amendment grounds.97
This litigation is discussed in the following subpart.
C. The Road to Caronia
Through persistent efforts, the pharmaceutical industry has loosened
FDA restrictions on off-label promotion. Challenges to restrictions on
the dissemination of printed material about off-label uses were successful in
the Washington Legal Foundation litigation.98 The U.S. Supreme Court
has not addressed off-label promotion through detailing, but the Court’s
cases expanding protection for commercial speech in general have provided
fresh ammunition in the industry’s battle for increased First Amendment
protection.99 In response to First Amendment challenges, the government
has indicated that it may be more selective in deciding which cases to
prosecute.100 The following subpart summarizes cases that addressed
First Amendment challenges to off-label promotion as well as the U.S.
Supreme Court cases that had a substantial impact on the Second Circuit’s
holding in United States v. Caronia.101
1. The Washington Legal Foundation Cases: Dissemination
of Printed Materials About Off-Label Use Is Protected
by the First Amendment
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, the Washington Legal
Foundation, a public interest law and policy center, challenged the
constitutionality of several FDA policies and guidance documents (FDA
Guidance) that sought to restrict manufacturers’ distribution of journal

97. In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, the court held that FDA
guidance restricting certain forms of manufacturer promotion of off-label uses were
unconstitutional restrictions of commercial speech under the First Amendment. 13 F.
Supp. 2d 51, 74–75 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated in part sub nom. Washington Legal Found.
v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But see Whitaker v. Thompson, 353
F.3d 947, 952–53 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the FDA did not violate the First
Amendment’s restrictions on commercial speech when it determined that a certain
dietary supplement had to be approved as a drug before it could be marketed as effective
in the treatment of a disease).
98. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
99. See infra Part III.B.
100. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 27, Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-1820 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2012) (“While
manufacturer speech is always a relevant factor in determining intended use, in the
absence of other evidence that an unapproved use is intended, a drug manufacturer that
engages in truthful and non-misleading speech about an approved use is not placing itself
in violation of the FDCA.”).
101. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
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article reprints and textbooks to physicians if they contained information
about off-label uses.102 In general, the FDA Guidance stated that
manufacturers should distribute only materials referencing off-label uses
if the materials were unabridged and were primarily about approved
FDA uses.103 The FDA sought to “strike the proper balance between the
need for an exchange of reliable scientific data and information within
the health care community, and the statutory requirements that prohibit
companies from promoting products for unapproved uses.”104 The
regulations pertained to so-called “enduring materials,” which include
journal articles and medical textbooks, and specifically targeted
dissemination of such materials by pharmaceutical companies.105
Among the requirements in the FDA Guidance, the Washington Legal
Foundation objected most strenuously to the requirement that the
primary focus of texts or reprinted articles distributed be about FDAapproved uses.106
The court analyzed the restrictions on disseminating printed materials
about off-label use as commercial speech, finding that it met the criteria
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corporation107: the speech is concededly an advertisement; the speech
refers to a specific product; and the speaker has an economic motive in
disseminating the material.108 Noting that the purpose of the commercial
speech doctrine is to “protect consumers from misleading, deceptive or
aggressive sales practices,” the court stated that manufacturers have

102. 13 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
103. Id. at 58 (citing Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain
Published, Original Data and Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference
Texts, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Reprint Guidance]).
104. Id. (quoting Reprint Guidance, supra note 103, at 52,800).
105. Id.
106. Brief for Appellee at 20–21, 24–26, Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202
F.3d 331, 336–37 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-5304). Other requirements included that the
reprint be from a peer-reviewed journal, prominent notification on the reprint of any
differences from the approved labeling, and that the material not be false or misleading.
Washington Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (citing Reprint Guidance, supra note
103, at 52,801). The guidance also required that medical textbooks and compendia
provide a balanced presentation and that the text not be substantially prepared or edited
by the manufacturer. Id. (citing Reprint Guidance, supra note 103, at 52,801).
107. 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
108. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
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considerable financial resources to influence physicians and that they are
more likely to disseminate only materials that favor their own product.109
Having concluded that the speech in question was properly classified
as commercial, the court applied the test announced by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York.110 Central Hudson’s four-prong analysis
considers: (1) whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) whether the government has a substantial interest in
regulating; (3) whether the regulation materially advances the government’s
interest; and (4) whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary.111
The court concluded that the FDA Guidance could not withstand
constitutional scrutiny.112 The Friedman court rejected the FDA’s argument
that off-label promotion is inherently misleading.113 The court stated
that the “FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe” by suggesting
that information about uses not approved by the FDA is inherently
misleading.114 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that the
FDA did not object to physicians receiving the same information about
off-label uses from sources other than the manufacturer.115
After concluding that off-label promotion is not inherently misleading,
the court examined the three remaining factors under Central Hudson.
The court found that the government had a substantial interest in
regulating off-label promotion to protect the public health and in
requiring manufacturers to seek approval for new uses.116 It also found
that these interests were materially advanced by the regulations because
“one of the few mechanisms available to FDA to compel manufacturer
behavior is to constrain their marketing options; i.e. control the labeling,
advertising and marketing.”117 Nevertheless, the court found that the
FDA Guidance was more restrictive of speech than necessary.118 Full
and unambiguous disclosure to physicians that the off-label uses are not
FDA-approved would, according to the court, be a less burdensome and
more effective manner of advancing the government’s interests.119 The
court found that because less restrictive means of meeting its interest were

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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Id. at 65 (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1984)).
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 566.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id.
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available, the government failed to meet Central Hudson’s requirements
and violated the First Amendment.120 The court held that the FDA could
not prohibit manufacturers from disseminating enduring materials
“regardless of whether such [materials] include[] a significant or exclusive
focus” on off-label uses because doing so unduly burdened speech.121
Some language in the decision, however, is critical to later First
Amendment challenges to FDA restrictions. The court emphasized that
its ruling covered a “very narrow form of manufacturer communication”
and that the FDA could prohibit many other types of communication to
physicians about off-label uses, including “person-to-person contact with
a physician.”122 The court stated that these “incentives . . . to get off-label
treatments on-label” were “central” to its decision, and that if manufacturers
were “permitted to engage in all forms of marketing of off-label treatments,
a different result might be compelled.”123
Subsequent to the Friedman case, Congress passed the Food and Drug
Administration and Modernization Act (FDAMA), which contained
provisions about the dissemination of material about off-label use by
manufacturers.124 Section 401 of FDAMA was intended to supersede
the previous FDA Guidance that was challenged in the Friedman case.
Section 401 required manufacturers to submit a supplemental application
to the FDA seeking approval of the off-label use within thirty-six months of
dissemination of the material in question, provide the materials to the
FDA sixty days prior to dissemination, disseminate materials in unabridged
form, and disclose to recipients that the materials pertain to an unapproved
use of the drug.125 In Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, the court
held that the provisions of FDAMA, like the FDA Guidance provisions
it had previously analyzed, were unconstitutional and infringed on
manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.126 The court was particularly
concerned about the requirements for supplemental applications, stating
120. Id. at 73–74.
121. Id. at 74. The court also held that the FDA could not prohibit manufacturers
from suggesting content to Continuing Medical Education providers. Id. at 74–75.
122. Id. at 73.
123. Id.
124. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
125. Shane M. Ward, WLF and the Two Click Rule: The First Amendment Inequity
of the Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Off-Label Drug Use Information
on the Internet, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 41, 47–48 (2001).
126. See Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999).
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“[t]he supplemental application requirement of the act amounts to a kind
of constitutional blackmail—comply with the statute or sacrifice your
First Amendment rights.”127
On appeal, the FDA maintained that the provisions of section 401 of
FDAMA merely provided a “safe harbor” and that FDAMA did not
authorize the FDA to prohibit or sanction speech.128 The FDA’s position
led the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to declare the
issue moot and to vacate the injunction of the lower court.129 The result
of the litigation was that manufacturers were free to disseminate reliable
scientific information about off-label uses. In 2009, the FDA issued
nonbinding recommendations about disseminating printed materials with
information about off-label use; these guidelines were revised in 2014.130
2. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center: Dissemination of
Information About the Compounding of Specific Drugs Is
Speech Protected by the First Amendment
First Amendment challenges to the dissemination of information about
certain drugs reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002. In Thompson v.
Western States Medical Center, the drug compounding industry complained
that certain provisions of FDAMA unconstitutionally burdened protected
speech.131 The Supreme Court’s analysis in Western States was similar
to that in the Washington Legal Foundation cases. The Court held that
the restrictions on advertising or promoting compounded drugs violated
the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee.132 Using the commercial
speech analysis from its Central Hudson decision, the Court recognized
that the restrictions advanced substantial government interests, but found
that they were not narrowly tailored, as the test requires.133
Drug compounding is a process that is designed to tailor medication to
the needs of an individual patient.134 Because the FDA approval process
would be prohibitively expensive and burdensome for such customized
drugs, the FDA has left regulation of compounding primarily to the
states and has not required compounders to seek approval for such
127. Id.
128. See Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
129. Id. at 335–37.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 91–97.
131. 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
132. See id. at 377.
133. See id. at 369–73. See supra text accompanying notes 110–111 (describing
the Central Hudson test).
134. Western States, 535 U.S. at 360–61. The Court noted that compounding is a
“traditional component of the practice of pharmacy” and “is taught as part of the
standard curriculum at most pharmacy schools.” Id. at 361.
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drugs.135 Nevertheless, the FDA became concerned that compounding
could provide a loophole for some pharmacists to manufacture and sell
drugs “under the guise of compounding.”136 Moreover, the government
maintained that advertising is “a fair proxy for actual or intended largescale manufacturing.”137 In other words, according to the government,
advertising should not be necessary for traditional compounding because
such prescriptions respond to individual needs. Consequently, section
503A of FDAMA recognized that compounded drugs are exempt from
the FDA drug approval process in general, but required compounders to
refrain from certain activities associated with manufacturers such as
soliciting business and advertising.138 The regulations allowed
compounders to advertise their services in general, but prohibited them
from advertising the compounding of specific drugs.139 Pharmacies that
specialized in compounding drugs challenged these provisions.140
135. See id. at 362. An outbreak of fungal meningitis in 2012 associated with a
product distributed by the New England Compounding Center (NECC) drew national
attention to the compounding industry. See Denise Grady, Second Illness Is Infecting
Those Struck By Meningitis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2012, at A14; Press Release, Exec.
Office of Health and Human Servs., Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Alert—New
England Compounding Center Product Recall Information (undated), available at
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/quality/boards/pharmacy/pharmacy-alert-necc.pdf.
A steroid injectable product received by approximately 14,000 patients across nineteen
states caused sixty-four deaths and over 750 cases of fungal meningitis in twenty states.
See Grady, supra, at A14. In response to the crisis, Congress amended the FDCA by
passing the Drug Quality and Security Act to ensure the safety of compounded drugs.
Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301–399f
(2013)). The Act has two distinct provisions. The Compounding Quality Act creates a
program that allows compounding manufacturers to voluntarily submit to FDA oversight
similar to that of traditional pharmaceutical manufacturers. The second provision, the
Drug Supply Chain Security Act, implements a tracking system requiring manufacturers
to affix bar codes to products introduced into the supply chain. Professor Kevin
Outterson describes the balance that the FDAMA restrictions on advertising sought to
achieve between traditional compounding activities and drug manufacturing. See Kevin
Outterson, Regulating Compounding Pharmacies After NECC, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 1969
(2012). According to Outterson, “[i]t’s possible that if the Supreme Court hadn’t struck
down Section 503A, the tragedy at NECC could have been averted.” Id. at 1971.
136. See Western States, 535 U.S. at 362. The regulations state that pharmacies
may “not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or
type of drug,” but may “advertise and promote the compounding service.” 21 U.S.C. §
353a (2012).
137. Western States, 535 U.S. at 370–71.
138. See 21 U.S.C. §353a(c).
139. See id.
140. Western States, 535 U.S. at 360.
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In considering whether the provisions prohibiting solicitation and
advertising of compounded drugs violated the First Amendment, the
Court used the Central Hudson analysis for commercial speech.141 The
government maintained that the FDAMA regulations met the Central
Hudson test because they served three substantial interests: preserving
the integrity of the FDA’s new drug approval process that protects the
public health; allowing compounded drugs to be available to those patients
who need them; and balancing these competing interests.142 The
government further asserted that the restrictions on promotion and
advertising separate small-scale compounding, which responds to individual
patient need, from large-scale drug manufacturing.143 The Court concluded,
however, that even assuming that the restrictions would materially
advance the government’s interests, the regulations did not satisfy the
Central Hudson test because they were not narrowly tailored.144 The
Court suggested several less burdensome alternatives that would be
nonspeech related.145 In short, the Court found that there was insufficient

141. See id. at 367–68.
142. See id. at 368.
143. Id. at 370–71.
144. Id. at 371–72. Justice Breyer authored a vigorous dissent, joined by the Chief
Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg. See id. at 378–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer wrote that “the Court seriously undervalues the importance of the
Government’s interest in protecting the health and safety of the American public.” Id. at
378–79. Unlike the majority of the Court, the dissenting justices recognized that a
restriction on advertising particular compounded drugs was part of a “finely tuned
balance” between the risks and benefits associated with compounded drug prescriptions.
Id. at 380–81. The dissenting justices recognized that traditional compounding relies on
a particular doctor making a determination for a particular patient, whereas advertising
compounded drugs has nothing to do with an individualized need or medical determination.
See id. at 381–82. Justice Breyer stated that the restrictions on advertising particular
compounded drugs “try to assure that demand is generated doctor-to-patient-to-pharmacist,
not pharmacist-to-advertisement-to-patient-to-doctor.” Id. at 382. The dissent criticized
the Court’s argument that restricting advertising is paternalistic in fearing that doctors or
patients might make “bad decisions if given truthful information.” Id. at 386–87.
According to the dissent, the government seeks to prevent “the adverse cumulative
effects of multiple individual decisions” which could in the aggregate “undermine the
safety testing system, thereby producing overall a net balance of harm.” Id.
145. See id. at 372. The Court suggested that the FDA could rely on factors listed
in its 1992 Compliance Policy Guide that distinguished between compounding and largescale manufacturing. For example, the court pointed out that the FDA could “prohibit
pharmacists from compounding more drugs in anticipation of receiving prescriptions
than in response to prescriptions already received,” “prohibit pharmacists from offering
compounded drugs products at wholesale to other state licensed persons or commercial
entities for resale,” or “limit the amount of compounded drugs . . . that a given pharmacist or
pharmacy sells out of state.” Id. (citations omitted).
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evidence that the restrictions on advertising were “necessary” as opposed to
“merely convenient” in promoting the government’s interests.146
3. United States v. Caputo: The First Amendment Does Not
Apply if the Use Is Unlawful
The Washington Legal Foundation decisions regarding dissemination
of printed materials about off-label use and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
expansive protection of advertising in Western States encouraged further
challenges to restrictions on off-label promotion. In United States v.
Caputo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit discussed, but
did not decide, whether a seller of drugs or medical devices has a
constitutional right to promote off-label uses.147
In Caputo, the defendants were convicted on several charges, including
introducing a misbranded device into interstate commerce. The FDA
approved a small sterilizer exclusively for use with stainless steel
instruments. Recognizing that there was no market for the FDA-approved
use, the defendants marketed a larger version of the device for use in
sterilizing a variety of surgical instruments.148 When brass instruments
were sterilized in the larger machine, a residue remained that caused
corneal decomposition and loss of vision to patients. The defendants
argued that off-label marketing of the larger machine for use with different
kinds of instruments was speech protected by the First Amendment.149
Because off-label use is legal, the defendants maintained, off-label
promotion cannot be restricted.150
The Seventh Circuit did not have to reach the First Amendment issue
because it concluded selling the device was not lawful.151 Had the facts
raised the issue of a machine lawfully sold but promoted for an off-label
use, however, the court noted that its decision might have been different.152
The court stated, “if a given use is lawful, and thus can be written about
freely in newspapers or blogs, and discussed among hospitals . . . doesn’t
it make a good deal of sense to allow speech by the device’s manufacturer,

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 373.
See 517 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2008).
See id. at 937.
See id. at 938.
See id.
Id. at 940.
See id. at 939.
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which after all will have the best information?”153 The court stated that
the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Western States indicated that
prohibiting manufacturers from “alerting consumers to lawful off-label
uses” is “unconstitutional in at least some applications” and that “drugs
[and by implication medical devices] are not a special case for firstamendment analysis.”154
The Seventh Circuit recognized, however, that there are dangers
associated with off-label promotion. Notably, the court stated that the
FDA could withhold approval of any use of a drug or device if it
anticipated the manufacturer would promote other uses, thereby depriving
the public of uses that the FDA excludes.155 The court cautioned that “a
court should hesitate before extending an [] historical reading of the
Constitution in a way that injures the very audience that is supposed to
benefit from free speech.”156 The court stated that it “[f]ortunately” did
not have to decide whether manufacturers may promote off-label because
there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the larger machine
was not lawfully sold.157 The machine, it found, was not a mere
modification of an approved device but a new device altogether. Without
lawful use, the court held, there is no need for First Amendment analysis.158
4. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.: The First Amendment Protects
Speech in Aid of Pharmaceutical Marketing
In deciding a 2011 case, the U.S. Supreme Court made a strong
statement about protecting the speech of pharmaceutical manufacturers.159
The case involved the Vermont Prescription Confidentiality Law, which
prohibited pharmaceutical companies and similar entities from using
prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes.160 Addressing
a First Amendment challenge to the statute, the Court held that “[s]peech
in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”161 Significantly,
the Court found that such speech is subject to “heightened judicial

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
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Id.
Id.
See id. at 940.
Id.
See id. at 940–41.
See id.
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
See id. at 2659.
See id.
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scrutiny” rather than the intermediate scrutiny applied to commercial
speech under the Central Hudson analysis.162
Data miners and pharmaceutical manufacturers of brand name drugs
challenged the Vermont law.163 Pharmacies are required by law to collect
and maintain detailed files about each prescription filled.164 The pharmacies
can sell these records, containing a doctor’s name and address, along
with the amount of the drug prescribed, to data miners who, in turn, may
lease the information to pharmaceutical companies.165 The information
is valuable to companies in effectively targeting doctors who might be
inclined to change their prescribing habits.166 Influencing doctors’
prescribing practices is largely achieved through detailing, the practice
of pharmaceutical sales representatives visiting doctors in their offices
with information about specific products.167 The Vermont legislature
had concluded that the information that pharmaceutical marketers
provide to doctors is “incomplete and biased.”168 Moreover, the legislature
found that despite the inadequacy of the information, doctors rely on it
because they do not have time to research the constant advances in new
drugs.169 In addition to protecting medical privacy interests, the state
maintained that its law sought to prevent companies from using this
information to influence doctors to prescribe the newest, most expensive
brand name drugs, thereby driving up health care costs and exposing
patients to newer drugs whose side effects may not yet be fully known.170
The Court’s approach to the First Amendment issue was significant.
Rather than using the well-established analysis for commercial speech
under Central Hudson, the Court found that “heightened scrutiny” was
required because the Vermont statute set forth content and speaker based
restrictions.171 The Court found that the Vermont law disfavored speech
162. See id.
163. See id. at 2660.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 2661.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 2659–61.
171. See id. at 2663–64. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Kagan. See id. at 2673–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that the
“heightened” standard of review was not required and that the statute met the First
Amendment standard for regulating commercial speech under Central Hudson. See id.
Justice Breyer was particularly concerned that applying a “‘heightened’ First Amendment
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with a particular content—marketing—when expressed by certain disfavored
speakers—pharmaceutical manufacturers.172 Thus, the Court found that
the law suffered from viewpoint discrimination because the Vermont
legislature designed the law to prevent marketers from more effectively
selling high cost brand-name drugs, rather than lower priced generic
drugs favored by the state.173 Heightened scrutiny is required, the Court
stated, “whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.’”174
Stating that “content-based” and “viewpoint discriminatory” laws are
presumptively invalid, the Court further demonstrated that the law would
meet the same fate under Central Hudson’s less demanding standard for
commercial speech.175 Under Central Hudson, the state has the burden
of proving that it has substantial interests in regulating and that those
interests are directly advanced by the law in question.176 The Court found
that the law did not advance Vermont’s purported interests in protecting
patient privacy and preventing influence on doctors’ prescribing habits
in a direct manner, as required.177 The confidentiality of prescription
decisions is not protected, the Court reasoned, because only marketers
are barred from using such information; researchers, journalists, and
others are not denied access to the information.178 The Court also rejected
the state’s argument that the law interfered with the doctor-patient
relationship by influencing prescribing decisions.179 The Court concluded
that the fact that doctors find such speech persuasive does not remove it
from First Amendment protection.180 As in Western States, the Court
emphasized the fact that the government cannot suppress information out
of fear that the public will misuse that information.181 Furthermore, the
Court noted that doctors, as the recipients of information through detailing,
are “‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.”182 The Court noted that a
standard of review whenever . . . a [regulatory] program burdens speech would transfer
from legislatures to judges the primary power to weigh ends and to choose means,
threatening to distort or undermine legitimate legislative objectives.” Id. at 2675 (citing
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 476 (1997)).
172. See id. at 2663 (majority opinion).
173. See id. at 2663–64.
174. Id. at 2664 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
175. See id. at 2667–72.
176. See id. at 2667–68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
177. See id. at 2670.
178. See id. at 2668.
179. See id. at 2670.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2670–7l (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374
(2002)).
182. Id. at 2671 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993)).
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state is free to put forth its own views on topics such as a preference for
generic drugs, but that it may not burden the speech of others who wish
to promote brand-name drugs.183
As the cases from Washington Legal Foundation to IMS Health
illustrate, First Amendment challenges to off-label promotion were wellestablished before the Caronia case was heard in federal district court in
2008. The industry had gained a significant victory in changing the
FDA’s thinking on the dissemination of printed materials. Language in
U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Western States and IMS Health
encouraged the industry to expand First Amendment protection for offlabel promotion by sales representatives.184 Neither of the Supreme
Court cases, however, specifically addressed issues raised by off-label
promotion through detailing.185 Furthermore, lower courts that considered
the implications of off-label promotion through detailing expressed
reservations and caution.186
III. THE CARONIA CASE
The case against Alfred Caronia, a sales representative for Orphan
Medical, arose in the context of a government investigation of the company
for the unlawful marketing and promotion of Xyrem, a powerful central
nervous system drug, classified by the federal government as a “date rape”
drug.187 Orphan, the manufacturer of the drug, agreed to pay $20 million
in penalties and victim compensation to resolve parallel criminal and
civil investigations.188 The agreement included a guilty plea by Orphan
to one count of felony misbranding of a drug product for off-label uses
under the FDCA.189 Peter Gleason, a psychiatrist who the government
183. Id.
184. See infra Part III.
185. See supra Parts II.C.2, II.C.4.
186. See, e.g., In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Products Liab. Litig., 618
F. Supp. 2d 96, 112 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding detailers had a duty to disclose side effects
of off-label use but failed to do so).
187. Jazz Pharmaceuticals acquired Orphan Medical in 2005. The U.S. Department of
Justice’s investigation began in 2006, when a former sales representative filed a suit
under the False Claims Act on behalf of the United States. See Press Release, U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Agrees To Pay $20
Million To Resolve Criminal and Civil Allegations in “Off-Label” Marketing Investigation
(July 13, 2007), available at www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2007/2007jul13a.html.
188. See id.
189. See id.
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alleged was paid tens of thousands of dollars to illegally promote Xyrem,
also pled guilty to a misdemeanor to conspire with Orphan Medical.190 Dr.
Gleason was sentenced to one year probation and a $25 fine.191 Alfred
Caronia, however, chose to go to trial and to appeal his conviction on the
grounds that promotion of the off-label uses was protected speech under
the First Amendment.192
A. The District Court Found That Prohibitions on Off-Label
Promotion Withstood Constitutional Scrutiny
Alfred Caronia, a sales representative of the company that manufactures
Xyrem, was charged with knowingly and intentionally conspiring with
others to misbrand the drug by promoting it for off-label uses.193 Caronia
argued that because doctors can lawfully prescribe FDA-approved drugs
for any use, the government cannot restrict truthful, non-misleading
promotion by a pharmaceutical manufacturer.194
The drug that Caronia allegedly misbranded, Xyrem, is a powerful
sleep-inducing depressant that the FDA approved for two indications:
cataplexy, a condition associated with narcolepsy, and excessive daytime
sleepiness associated with narcolepsy.195 The side effects of the drug are
so serious, including seizures, coma, and death, that Xyrem’s labeling
contains a black box warning, the most serious warning the FDA issues.196
Designated as a Schedule III Controlled Substance for medical use, Xyrem
cannot be sold or distributed to anyone other than for a prescribed use.197

190. See Harvey Silverglate, A Doctor’s Posthumous Vindication, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 25, 2012, 5:24 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873239
81504578174973015235686; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of
N.Y., Psychiatrist Charged with Conspiracy To Illegally Market the Prescription
Medication Xyrem, Also Known As “Ghb,” for Unapproved Medical Uses on Behalf of
Its Manufacturer (Apr. 5, 2006), available at www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006
apr05.html.
191. Silverglate, supra note 190. Silverglate wrote that the decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vindicated Gleason when Caronia “won the
point” that Gleason had argued that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right of
physicians, drug manufacturers, sales representatives and anyone else who wishes to
convey truthful, factual information about the beneficial uses of drugs in the relief of
illness and pain.” Id. Silverglate states that Gleason’s career and finances were ruined
by the suit and that Gleason ultimately took his own life as a result. Id.
192. See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2008),
rev’d 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
193. Id. at 389.
194. Id. at 393.
195. Id. at 388–89.
196. Id. at 389.
197. Id.
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The government charged Caronia with conspiring to misbrand the
drug because he promoted it for unapproved uses such as insomnia,
fibromyalgia, muscle disorders, and chronic pain.198 Despite the serious
risks associated with Xyrem, Caronia stated that it was “a very safe
drug,” with no contraindications.199 It is worth noting that Caronia was
under substantial pressure to sell the drug for off-label uses: representatives
were required to meet an annual sales quota of 520 bottles of Xyrem in
2005, the year of the allegedly illegal off-label promotion; meeting sales
targets had a substantial impact on salaries; and Caronia ranked near the
bottom of the company’s national sales force.200
In analyzing the First Amendment defense to the charge of misbranding,
the district court concluded that the speech in question was commercial
because it satisfied the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.: (1) the expression is an
advertisement; (2) it refers to a specific product; and (3) the speaker has
an economic motivation for speaking.201 Having concluded that Caronia’s
promotion of the drug qualified as commercial speech, the court
employed the Central Hudson test to assess its constitutionality.202
Central Hudson requires: (1) that the speech is lawful and not misleading;
(2) that the government demonstrate a substantial interest; (3) that the
regulation directly advances that interest; and (4) that the restriction is
not more extensive than necessary.203
The district court found that the FDCA’s restrictions on off-label
promotion were constitutional. The court recognized that the government
has a substantial interest in the health and safety of its citizens as well as
in subjecting drugs to the FDA premarket approval process.204 The court
found that restrictions on off-label promotion by manufacturers directly
advance the FDA’s interest in maintaining its approval process.205
Citing Friedman and Caputo, the court recognized that manufacturers
198. Id.
199. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 172 n.3 (2d Cir. 2012) (Livingston, J.,
dissenting).
200. See id.
201. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983)).
202. See id. at 396–402 (applying the test established in Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
203. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
204. See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
205. See id.
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have little incentive to seek FDA approval for off-label uses and that
restricting marketing behavior is one of the few methods in which the
FDA can encourage manufacturers to seek FDA approval for new uses
of a drug that has been approved.206
Finally, the court found that the FDA restrictions on off-label promotion
are not more restrictive than necessary.207 Building on the cautionary
language raised in Friedman and Caputo, the court concluded that the
FDA’s prohibition on off-label promotion is necessary “to ensure that
manufacturers will not seek approval only for certain limited uses of
drugs, then promote that same drug for off-label uses, effectively
circumventing the FDA’s new drug requirements.”208
B. The Second Circuit Held That Restricting Off-Label Promotion by
Pharmaceutical Representatives Violates the First Amendment
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower
court’s ruling, finding that prosecuting a pharmaceutical representative
for promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug
violates the First Amendment.209 In a 2-1 decision, the court stated that
the government improperly construed the misbranding provision of the
FDCA to prohibit promotional speech.210
The court noted that the FDCA criminalizes misbranding or
conspiring to misbrand a drug, but the Act does not expressly prohibit
the promotion of a drug for off-label use.211 Although the government
argued that it emphasized promotion only as evidence of intent to misbrand,
the court was not persuaded.212 Instead, the court found the trial record
showed that the defendant was prosecuted and convicted for his speech.213
Although jury instructions included explanations about the elements of
misbranding and conspiring to misbrand, the court found that the
government’s summation, together with the jury instructions, gave the
impression that the off-label promotion itself was prohibited.214 According
to the Second Circuit, construing the FDCA’s misbranding provisions to
206. See id. (referencing United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) and Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C. 1998),
vacated in part sub nom. Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 336-37
(D.C. Cir. 2000)).
207. See id. at 401.
208. Id. (citing Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 72).
209. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012).
210. See id.
211. See id. at 154.
212. See id. at 160–62.
213. Id. at 161.
214. See id.
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criminalize the simple promotion of a drug’s off-label use by pharmaceutical
representatives would “run afoul of the First Amendment.”215
When the Second Circuit heard the appeal in United States v. Caronia,
it had the benefit of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS
Health,216 which had not been decided when the district court reached its
decision. The Court’s statement in IMS Health that “speech in aid of
pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the . . .
First Amendment” together with the “heightened scrutiny” standard the
Court used changed the analysis of the Caronia case substantially.217
In IMS Health, the Court required heightened scrutiny because the
statute imposed both content and speaker based restrictions, which the
Court stated are “presumptively invalid.”218 In Caronia, the Second
Circuit found that the FDCA’s misbranding provisions impose similar
restrictions. Off-label promotion is content-based, according to the
court, because it distinguishes between favored speech—uses that are
FDA-approved—and disfavored speech—uses that are not FDAapproved.219 Prohibiting off-label promotion is speaker-based, the court
reasoned, because it targets one kind of speaker—pharmaceutical
manufacturers and their representatives—while allowing others, such as
doctors and academics, to speak about off-label use.220
Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in IMS Health, the Second
Circuit also demonstrated that restrictions on off-label promotion could
not withstand constitutional scrutiny under Central Hudson. The court
recognized the government’s substantial interests in reducing the public’s
exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs and in preserving the FDA’s
drug approval process.221 The court found, however, that a prohibition
on off-label promotion failed to satisfy Central Hudson’s requirement
that the law directly advance the government’s interest because the

215. Id. at 162.
216. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
217. Id. at 2659, 2664 (providing the standards used by the U.S. Second Circuit
Court of Appeals); compare United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396–402
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (decided prior to IMS Health), with Caronia, 703 F.3d at 163–64
(applying the standards set forth in IMS Health).
218. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382 (1992)).
219. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 166.
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FDA’s approval process anticipates that drugs will be used off-label.222
Moreover, drawing on IMS Health, the court found that prohibiting offlabel promotion “paternalistically” interferes with both doctors’ and
patients’ access to information about off-label use.223 The court concluded
that if “the government’s objective is to shepherd physicians to prescribe
drugs only on-label, criminalizing manufacturer promotion of off-label
use while permitting others to promote such use to physicians is an
indirect and questionably effective means to achieve that goal.”224 The
court also concluded that restrictions on off-label promotion are not
narrowly tailored to meet the government’s interests and suggested several
other ways to regulate off-label promotion that would intrude less on the
First Amendment.225
The court noted that the FDCA makes it a crime to misbrand or conspire
to misbrand a drug, but that the statute and its regulations do not expressly
prohibit or criminalize off-label promotion.226 To avoid conflict with the
First Amendment, the court concluded that the FDCA should not be
construed as criminalizing the simple promotion of a drug’s off-label use.227
C. Judge Livingston’s Dissent Provided Compelling Arguments That
Restrictions on Off-Label Promotion Are Constitutional
The majority in Caronia suggested that a case in which off-label
promotion is presented merely as evidence of the intent to misbrand

222. See id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 167.
225. See id. at 167–68. To seek a more limited and targeted approach to off-label
promotion, the court suggested the following:
1. More directly address off-label use.
2. Guide physicians and patients to differentiate between misleading and
false promotion and truthful or non-misleading promotion.
3. Develop warning or disclaimer systems or safety tiers within the off-label
market to distinguish between drugs.
4. Require pharmaceutical manufacturers to list all applicable or intended
indications when they first apply for FDA approval, enabling physicians,
the government, and patients to track a drug’s development.
5. Create other limits, including ceilings or caps on off-label prescriptions.
6. Further regulate the legal liability surrounding off-label promotion and
treatment decisions, perhaps using medical malpractice and negligence
theories of liability.
7. Prohibit off-label prescription altogether where such use is exceptionally
concerning, as was done with human growth hormone.
See id. at 168.
226. Id. at 160.
227. Id.
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could be successful.228 At the same time, the court’s analysis of the First
Amendment challenge threatens to eviscerate the prohibition against
misbranding—a prohibition that strikes at the very heart of the FDA’s
fundamental purpose. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Livingston made
convincing arguments that IMS Health and Western States do not compel
the result reached by the majority and that restrictions on off-label
promotion are constitutional.229
1. Off-Label Promotion Is Evidence of Intent To Misbrand
Judge Livingston stated that Caronia’s conviction should have been
confirmed because his speech was evidence of his intent to misbrand.230
Livingston cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, in which the Court recognized that the First Amendment “does
not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a
crime or to prove motive or intent.”231 She also cited a case decided by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that concluded using speech
“in the form of labeling” to infer intent is constitutionally permissible.232
In Whitaker v. Thompson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
addressed First Amendment issues similar to those in Caronia. A seller
marketed saw palmetto extract as a treatment for enlarged prostate
symptoms, claiming that the marketing statements he made were truthful
and not misleading.233 The court found that the statements about the
product’s intended use were drug claims, subject to the FDA approval
process and consequently that the proposed label constituted speech
about unlawful activity.234 The court found that “a product’s label may
often be the only readily available evidence of the product’s intended
use.” 235 In Whitaker, the court concluded that it is constitutionally
228. See id. at 172 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 169–82.
230. See id. at 169.
231. Id. at 171 (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)).
232. Id. at 177 (quoting Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir.
2004)). The case involved the sale of saw palmetto, an extract from a dwarf American
palm, and a dispute about the types of claims the seller could place on its label. The
seller proposed a label that read: “Consumption of 320 mg daily of Saw Palmetto extract
may improve urine flow, reduce nocturia and reduce voiding urgency associated with
mild benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH).” Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 948.
233. See Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 952.
234. See id. at 953.
235. Id. at 950.
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permissible for the FDA to use speech, in the form of labeling, to infer
intent for purposes of determining whether the seller’s proposed sale of
the product is illegal.236 Judge Livingston maintained that the prosecution’s
reliance on Caronia’s statements that Xyrem could be used to treat
several off-label indications such as insomnia, periodic leg movement,
Parkinson’s and multiple sclerosis, were merely evidence of the intended
uses and did not interfere with Caronia’s First Amendment rights.237
Judge Livingston expressed concern as to whether the majority’s
reasoning would ever allow a conviction for misbranding.238 The better
reasoned analysis, she stated, would be to conclude that Caronia was
prosecuted for misbranding and that his speech, the promotion of an offlabel use, demonstrated his objective intent to introduce a misbranded
drug into commerce. 239 In other words, “promotion of a use may
demonstrate an objective intent that the drug be used for that purpose.”240
Even though doctors may legally prescribe for an off-label use, Livingston
noted that “otherwise permissible conduct may become impermissible if
undertaken with a prohibited motive, and speech may be used as evidence
of such a motive.”241 Livingston provided the following example to
illustrate:
There might be no law forbidding the consumption of arsenic. But this would
not endow Abby and Martha with a First Amendment right to offer arseniclaced wine to lonely old bachelors with the intent that they drink it. And any
statements Abby or Martha made suggesting their intent—even if all of the
statements were truthful and not misleading—would not be barred from evidence by
the First Amendment simply because arsenic might legally be consumed.242

2. Western States and IMS Health Do Not Compel the Result
Reached in Caronia
Judge Livingston was not persuaded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decisions in Western States and IMS Health dictated the outcome reached
by the majority in Caronia. She found that the cases are distinguishable
because, in Western States and IMS Health, “[s]peech alone was sufficient

236. Id. at 953.
237. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 171–72 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 172. The majority in Caronia stated that “[e]ven assuming the government
can offer evidence of a defendant’s off-label promotion to prove a drug’s intended use
and, thus, mislabeling for that intended use, that is not what happened in this case.” Id.
at 161 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
239. See id. at 173 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 174.
241. Id. at 175.
242. Id. (referring to ARSENIC AND OLD LACE (Warner Brothers Pictures 1944)).
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to trigger liability under the challenged statutes.”243 The FDA regulation
challenged in Western States prohibited pharmacies from advertising or
promoting the compounding of a particular drug.244 In IMS Health, the
statute targeted speech directly because it prohibited pharmaceutical
manufacturers from using prescriber identifiable information for marketing
or promotion.245 In contrast, for a misbranding conviction, something more
than just speech is required. Without evidence of intent to introduce the
drug into commerce for an unapproved use, Caronia could not have been
convicted of misbranding “no matter what he said.”246
Judge Livingston also demonstrated that the FDCA’s misbranding
provisions can be distinguished from the content- and speaker-based
scrutiny required by the U.S. Supreme Court in IMS Health. The dissent
noted that IMS Health reaffirms the principle that restrictions on
commercial speech may be constitutionally permissible because of the
government’s interest in protecting consumers from harm.247 Regarding
the content-based restrictions, the statute challenged in IMS Health was
not aimed at preventing false or misleading speech; the FDA approval
process, by contrast, seeks to prevent dangerous products with false and
misleading labels from entering the market.248 The heightened scrutiny
for speaker based restrictions used in IMS Health is inapplicable to off-label
promotion, according to Judge Livingston, because drug manufacturers are
not a targeted group of speakers, as the majority in Caronia suggested,
but rather “form the entirety of those speakers that could possibly
undermine the new drug approval process by not participating in it.”249
3. Off-Label Promotion Survives Central Hudson Analysis
According to Judge Livingston, the misbranding provisions of the
FDCA survive constitutional scrutiny under the Central Hudson analysis
because the provisions directly advance a substantial government interest
and are narrowly drawn to further that interest.250 Judge Livingston noted
that the government’s substantial interest in “preserving the effectiveness
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 176.
See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 370–71 (2002).
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
Caronia, 703 F.3d at 176 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
Id. at 180 (citing IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2672).
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 177.
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and integrity” of the FDCA’s new drug approval process is not disputed.251
Moreover, she called attention to cases in which the Court has recognized
that “one of the FDCA’s core objectives is to ensure that any product
regulated by the FDA is safe and effective for its intended use.”252
Given these substantial interests, Judge Livingston found that allowing
pharmaceutical representatives to promote off-label would discourage
manufacturers from seeking approval for new uses, thereby calling into
“question the very foundations of our century-old system of drug
regulation.”253 Judge Livingston agreed with language in Washington
Legal Foundation and Caputo that prohibiting off-label promotion is
“‘one of the few mechanisms available’ to encourage participation in the
approval process.”254 Furthermore, she maintained that “if drug
manufacturers have a First Amendment right to distribute drugs for any
use to physicians or even directly to patients, then the entire FDCA may
well be unconstitutional.”255
Judge Livingston concluded that the restrictions on off-label promotion
are not more extensive than necessary.256 In her dissent, she refuted each of
the alternative regulations proposed by the majority as either ineffective
or impractical.257 Notably, she stated that a disclaimer system will still
encourage manufacturers to bypass the approval process, and a ceiling or
prohibition on off-label prescription would require extensive data tracking
and could deny some patients the off-label use they need.258
Judge Livingston’s dissent more accurately reflects Congress’s concerns
about the importance of the FDA approval process than does the majority

251. Id. at 178 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369
(2002)). In Western States, the Court stated, “Preserving the effectiveness and integrity
of the FDCA’s new drug approval process is clearly an important governmental interest,
and the Government has every reason to want as many drugs as possible to be subject to
that approval process.” Western States, 535 U.S. at 369.
252. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 177 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
253. Id. at 169.
254. Id. at 178 (quoting Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51,
72 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated in part sub nom. Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202
F.3d 331, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 940
(7th Cir. 2008) (pointing out that consumers and firms who do not desire to promote
drugs or devices off-label would be worse off if the FDA could not prohibit off-label
promotion).
255. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 179 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
256. See id. at 179–80.
257. Id.; see supra note 225 (listing some of the majority’s suggestions for less
restrictive means of meeting the government’s interest in reducing the public’s exposure
to unsafe and ineffective drugs).
258. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 179–80 (Livingston, J., dissenting).

682

[VOL. 51: 645, 2014]

Off-Label Promotion
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

opinion.259 Moreover, the dissent echoes the warnings that some lower
court decisions that have issued against sweeping too broadly where offlabel promotion is concerned because prohibiting such behavior is one of
the only mechanisms to incentivize drug manufacturers to seek FDA
approval for new uses. In addition to Judge Livingston’s strong arguments
against the majority’s decision, there are other critical factors about offlabel promotion and the relationship between physicians and pharmaceutical
salespeople that the court has not adequately addressed. In fact, several
assumptions about the relationship between physicians and pharmaceutical
companies that the U.S. Supreme Court relied on in Western States and
IMS Health must be revisited to adequately address the dangers of off-label
promotion.
IV. OFF-LABEL PROMOTION IS FALSE AND MISLEADING SPEECH
To avoid First Amendment concerns in prosecuting companies for offlabel promotion, the government may be more successful in demonstrating
that the specific speech at issue is not truthful and therefore not deserving
of First Amendment protection. A more general approach is to show
that restrictions on off-label promotion were put in place precisely because
off-label promotion is inherently misleading.
In Caronia, the defendant maintained that he was prosecuted for
truthful, off-label promotion. But the truthfulness of Caronia’s statements
was never at issue in the trial because the government believed it needed
to show only that he promoted the drug for an off-label use.260
Undoubtedly, the government could have presented evidence that
Caronia’s statements were false or misleading. For example, Caronia
described Xyrem as a very safe drug with no contraindications, stating
that “for the problems with insomnia there’s no better drug, no safer
drug, it’s as safe as Ambien and Sonata.”261 As the government continues
to pursue companies and individuals for off-label promotion, it may
choose to avoid the First Amendment analysis by emphasizing the
fraudulent nature of the speech rather than the more technical aspects of
misbranding. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Harkonen
provides an example of why this course may be more successful.262
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 177.
Id. at 160 (majority opinion).
Id. at 172 n.3 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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A. United States v. Harkonen: The First Amendment Does Not Protect
Speech That Is Fraudulent or Inherently Misleading
Although the Caronia decision purports to protect truthful, off-label
speech, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished
per curiam decision, held that fraudulent off-label promotion is not
deserving of First Amendment protection.263 The decisions by the Ninth
and Second Circuits do not create a clear circuit split because they
addressed different issues related to off-label promotion. The Harkonen
case dealt primarily with a charge of wire fraud and whether the jury
could reasonably conclude that the defendant’s speech was fraudulent.264
The fraudulent nature of the speech, according to the Ninth Circuit,
removed the case from First Amendment analysis.265 Because the jury
did not convict Harkonen on the misbranding charge, the Ninth Circuit
did not address the interpretation of the misbranding provision that was
central to the Caronia decision.266 Because it is unpublished, the Harkonen
decision is limited to the facts of the case.
In 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice began an investigation into
the off-label marketing of the drug Actimmune.267 The FDA approved
the drug to treat two rare diseases that afflict approximately 800
Americans. 268 The company, InterMune, began marketing the drug offlabel for idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF), a serious lung disease that
affects some 200,000 Americans, with 50,000 new cases diagnosed each
year.269 There is no cure for IPF.270 Unless patients receive a lung
transplant, they usually die within two to five years.271 Between 2000

263. See id. at 633.
264. See id. at 636.
265. See id.
266. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257, at *2
(N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010).
267. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at *1
(N.D. Cal. June 4, 2009).
268. See id.; Andrew Pollack, Talking Up a Drug for This (and That), N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2003, at BU 3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/27/business/talkingup-a-drug-for-this-and-that.html. In or around 1990, the FDA approved Actimmune to
treat chronic granulomatous disease. In or around 2000, the FDA approved it to treat
severe, malignant osteopetrosis. Both indications are rare disorders that primarily affect
children. Harkonen, 2009 WL 1578712, at *1.
Harkonen, 2009 WL 1578712, at *1.
269.
270. Pulmonary Fibrosis, A M . L UNG A SS ’ N , http://www.lung.org/lung-disease/
pulmonary-fibrosis (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
271. See Pollack, supra note 268.
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and 2003, most sales of Actimmune were for the off-label treatment of
IPF and sales increased from $11 million to $141 million.272
The off-label promotion of Actimmune for IPF was sparked by a
paper published in 1999 in the New England Journal of Medicine.273
The article indicated that, based on a small trial, Actimmune might be
effective in treating IPF, but that a larger, more scientifically controlled
study was needed to test the results.274 Based on these results, InterMune
began marketing the drug off-label. It also organized a larger in-house
trial that included 330 patients. This trial showed that the drug was not
effective in general.275 In a subset of patients with milder disease, however,
the trial showed that there might be encouraging results.276
The studies conducted by InterMune raised significant questions about
how the data from such trials are interpreted. At trial, the jury heard
testimony about the protocol for scientific studies and how the objectives
of a study are defined.277 Although the protocol for a study can be changed
after the study begins, a final protocol must be in place before the data is
made available to the researchers to prevent manipulation of the data.278
The protocol for the IPF trial involved one primary endpoint: “progressionfree survival time.”279 The study missed its primary endpoint. In other
words, Actimmune was not effective in halting the progression or increasing
the survival time for IPF patients.280 The trial also had ten secondary
endpoints, all of which it missed.281 If a primary endpoint fails, secondary
endpoints are considered to be “hypothesis generating,” providing

272. Harkonen, 2009 WL 1578712, at *3. Anecdotal information from patients
who used Actimmune for IPF is mixed. One patient accused Harkonen of publishing “an
outright lie.” The patient injected himself with Actimmune every other day for eighteen
months, at a cost of $6000 a month for the drug. He believes that subsequent clinical
trials indicated the drug was not only ineffective, but that it exposed hundreds of patients
to serious risks. He also stated that “[c]reating false hope is a serious crime, let alone
exposing someone to these risks.” See Mike Henderson, Patient’s View on Actimmune
CEO Sentence, GOOD PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES (May 5, 2011), http://goodpromotional
practices.com/2011/05/05/what-about-the-patients.
273. See Harkonen, 2009 WL 1578712, at *2.
274. Id.
275. Harkonen, 2010 WL 2985257, at *4; Harkonen, 2009 WL 158712, at *2.
276. See Harkonen, 2010 WL 2985257, at *4.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at *5.
280. See id. at *9.
281. Id. at *7.
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information to be tested in future trials.282 Nevertheless, InterMune focused
on the data generated by secondary endpoints and subgroup analyses.283
The government alleged that beginning in the fall of 2000, Dr. Harkonen,
the CEO of InterMune, and others at the company, misrepresented
the import of the data from the trial to promote the drug for IPF.284
Focusing on results from a subset of patients, Dr. Harkonen issued a press
release with the headline, “InterMune announces Phase III data demonstrating
survival benefit of Actimmune in IPF,” followed by “Reduces Mortality
by 70% in Patients with Mild to Moderate Disease.”285 The court explained
that “the jury could have found that Harkonen’s choice of words in the
press release implied causation between Actimmune and the survival of IPF
patients, when the data from the study objectively did not establish any
such certain and/or verifiable relationship.”286 Before the press release
was issued, many sources had told Harkonen that the trial missed its
primary endpoint as well as all ten secondary endpoints.287 Harkonen was
told that the subgroup analysis results focusing on mild to moderate IPF
patients were “unreliable and inconclusive.”288 InterMune’s Senior Director
of Biostatistics testified that “post-hoc analyses are ‘good science’ in the
sense that they may generate hypotheses for future study, but that he
‘winced’ when he saw the Press Release because ‘the conclusiveness of
the results was overstated.’”289

282. See id. In Bad Pharma, Ben Goldacre explains the danger of changing
outcomes from trials by people who “switch their primary outcomes,” as well as the problems
involved in subgroup analyses. See BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES
MISLEAD DOCTORS AND HARM PATIENTS 200–12 (2012).
283. See Harkonen, 2010 WL 2985257, at *9–10.
284. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at *2
(N.D. Cal. June 4, 2009).
285. Id.
286. Harkonen, 2010 WL 2985257, at *9. The court elaborated:
The jury heard credible testimony that in clinical trials with multiple endpoints,
where the primary endpoint is missed, and where researchers conduct post-hoc,
subgroup analyses, p-values are unreliable. Thus, depending on the context,
sub-0.05 p-values do not “demonstrate”, prove, establish or indicate anything.
Under such circumstances, secondary endpoint and post-hoc, subgroup analyses
can only be used in an exploratory manner, providing researchers with some
indication about additional relationships between a drug and a condition that
might warrant further investigation. The press release, however, equates a pvalue of less than 0.05 with statistical significance, causation and efficacy without
any adjustment for context, including for secondary endpoints and post-hoc
analyses.
Id.
287. Id. at 12.
288. Id.
289. United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 638 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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The company distributed the press release to sales representatives with
instructions on how to discuss it with doctors.290 The company also
hired a marketing firm to explore how pulmonologists would react to the
information.291 Sales representatives, complete with incentive and bonus
plans related to sales of Actimmune for IPF, were sent to detail
pulmonologists.292
Harkonen was indicted for disseminating information regarding
Actimmune for the treatment of IPF with the intent to defraud and
mislead, and causing Actimmune to be misbranded.293 He was convicted
on a charge of wire fraud but found not guilty on the misbranding
count.294 Harkonen appealed his conviction, arguing that the press release
was speech protected by the First Amendment.295
The Ninth Circuit began with the proposition that the First Amendment
does not protect fraudulent speech.296 In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme
Court cited fraud as one of the long recognized categories of contentbased speech that may be restricted.297 Thus, the Ninth Circuit focused
on whether facts found by the jury established that the press release was
fraudulent. The court found that the evidence supported the conclusion
that the press release was misleading, that Harkonen knew it was
misleading, and that he had the specific intent to defraud.298 At trial,
witnesses testified that the press release misrepresented the results of the
company’s in-house trial and that Harkonen had prevented InterMune’s

290. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at *2
(N.D. Cal. June 4, 2009).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at *1.
294. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257, at *1
(N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010).
295. United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 635–36 (9th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam).
296. Id. at 636 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012)).
297. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). In Alvarez, however, the
Court held that the defendant’s false statements about receiving the Congressional Medal
of Honor were protected by the First Amendment and that the Stolen Valor Act, which
criminalized such false statements, was unconstitutional. See id. at 2551. According to
the Court, “the law allows content-based regulation of speech” in only a “few categories”; it
does not allow “any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements.” Id.
at 2544.
298. See Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636–37.
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clinical personnel from seeing the press release prior to publication.299
He also sought to hide the analysis of the trial data from the FDA,
stating that he “didn’t want to make it look like we were doing repeated
analyses looking for a better result.”300 The court found that Harkonen’s
statement that he would “cut that data and slice it until he got the kind of
results he was looking for” showed specific intent to defraud.301
Harkonen maintained that the First Amendement protected his statements
because they involved scientific debate and were beyond the reach of the
wire fraud statute.302 This argument rested on a 1902 U.S. Supreme
Court decision, American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
which held that genuine debates over whether a given treatment caused a
particular effect are outside the scope of the mail and wire fraud
statutes.303 The Ninth Circuit found that McAnnulty does not prohibit all
prosecutions based on fraudulent statements about the efficacy of a
drug.304 The court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Seven Cases v.
United States, in which the Court found that “false and fraudulent
representations may be made with respect to the curative effect of
substances.”305 Harkonen also argued that “his statements were fraudulent
only if they were universally considered objectively false.”306 The court
rejected the argument, stating that “the term ‘to defraud’ has its
commonplace definition and includes any sort of ‘dishonest method or
scheme,’ and any ‘trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.’”307 Finally, the
court rejected Harkonen’s argument that “he was engaging in a genuine
scientific debate,” concluding that “genuine debates of any sort are, by
299. See id. at 636.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 637.
303. See id. (referencing Am. School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94 (1902)).
304. See id.
305. Id. (quoting Seven Cases of Eckman’s Alterative v. United States, 239 U.S.
510, 517 (1916)). In Seven Cases, the Court considered misbranding charges against a
company that purportedly made false and fraudulent statements about a product. A
circular mailed with the product stated, “We know it has cured and that it has and will
cure Tuberculosis,” and “Effective as a preventative for Pneumonia.” Seven Cases, 239
U.S. at 514. The Court emphasized that the statements accompanying the product were
“false and fraudulent.” Id. at 517. The Court distinguished between the owner’s right to
“give his views regarding the effect of his drugs” and “false and fraudulent
representations.” Id. at 517–18. The Court stated, “Congress recognized that there was a
wide field in which assertions as to curative effect are in no sense honest expressions of
opinion but constitute absolute falsehoods and in the nature of the case can be deemed to
have been made only with fraudulent purpose.” Id. at 518. As in Harkonen, supra, the
Court emphasized the “actual intent to deceive.” Id. at 519.
306. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 637.
307. Id. (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987)).
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definition, not fraudulent.”308 In short, the court found that the jury had
considered conflicting scientific information and found that Harkonen’s
statements about Actimmune’s efficacy for treating IPF were misleading.309
As an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is limited to
its facts. But the decision provides useful information for future
prosecutions involving off-label promotion.310 Harkonen suggests that
cases involving off-label promotion are likely to be most successful
when the fraudulent nature of a marketing scheme is clear and compelling.
B. Prohibiting Misbranding as False and Misleading
The Court has stated clearly that information that is “false or misleading
in any way” whether “commercial or otherwise” is not protected under
the First Amendment,311 and that the government is “free to prevent the
dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
misleading . . . or that proposes an illegal transaction.”312 The Court has
gone farther, stating that governments may “ban commercial expression
that is fraudulent or deceptive without further justification.”313 Thus, in
seeking to prohibit off-label promotion, the government would be wise
to emphasize the illegality of misbranding as well as the false, deceptive,
or misleading nature of the information provided by detailers.

308. Id.
309. See id.
310. While other cases alleging false statements in off-label promotion have not
reached the courts, companies have admitted to making false statements to doctors
pursuant to off-label marketing strategies. For example, Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of
OxyContin, acknowledged that its sales representatives had made false statements to
doctors, claiming that OxyContin was more resistant to abuse and less likely to cause
addiction than competing products. See Richard C. Ausness, “There’s Danger Here,
Cherie!” Liability for the Promotion and Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devices for
Off-Label Uses, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1253, 1262–64 (2008). The company promoted
OxyContin for use every eight hours instead of the twelve hours approved by the FDA.
Id. at 1262. The company paid $19.5 million to states to settle a civil suit based on its
alleged promotion of off-label use. Id. Purdue Pharma also paid $470 million in fines
and payments to state and federal agencies and $130 million to settle civil lawsuits
brought against the company by former patients who claimed to have become addicted to
OxyContin. Id. at 1263. The $600 million the company paid in fines and civil penalties
was about ninety percent of the profits it made from its initial OxyContin sales. Id.
311. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
312. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
313. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993).
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In Western States, the Court stated, “we ask as a threshold matter
whether [a pharmacy’s] commercial speech . . . is misleading. If so, then
the speech is not protected by the First Amendment.”314 But in Western
States, IMS Health, and Caronia, the government did not assert that the
defendant’s speech was false or misleading. In IMS Health, the Court
stated, “the State nowhere contends that detailing is false or misleading
within the meaning of this Court’s First Amendment precedents. . . .
Nor does the State argue that the provision challenged here will prevent
false or misleading speech.”315 The information at issue in both Western
States and IMS Health involved verifiable factual information. In Western
States, the information at issue involved advertising that a particular
compounder made a particular product;316 in IMS Health, the information
involved which drugs particular doctors prescribed.317 In Caronia, the
government likely could have asserted that the information the defendant
provided about Xyrem was false and misleading. Based on its construction
of the misbranding statute, however, the government presumed that it
needed to show only that the defendant had conspired to misbrand the
drug.318 Given the uncertainty of the Court’s analysis of commercial
speech—the “heightened scrutiny” introduced in IMS Health, as well as
what one justice termed the “unforgiving” version of Central Hudson
introduced in Western States,319 the government should present cases
involving off-label promotion through detailing as false and inherently
misleading.
A common sense approach to the issue of off-label detailing is arguing
the practice is inherently misleading. One author maintains that marketing
strategies such as detailing have no purpose other than to “pervert
evidence-based decision-making in medicine.”320 U.S. Supreme Court
precedent provides some hope for this argument, but poses challenges as
well. The nature of in-person solicitation by detailers makes the practice
particularly susceptible to fraudulent and misleading information. In
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, the Court recognized that “faceto-face” solicitation by a lawyer might lead to problems such as “undue
influence” and “fraud.”321 In Ohralik, the Court also noted that in-person

314. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002).
315. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
316. See Western States, 535 U.S. at 357.
317. See IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
318. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 158 (2d Cir. 2012).
319. See IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
320. See GOLDACRE, supra note 282, at 246.
321. 436 U.S. 447, 448, 464 (1978). The Court held that a state has the right to
discipline attorneys “for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent.” Id. at 447.
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solicitation presents unique regulatory difficulties because it is “not visible
or otherwise open to public scrutiny.”322 Such solicitations, the Court
stated, are “one-sided” and may encourage “uninformed decisionmaking.”323
The Court concluded that rules prohibiting in-person solicitation by
lawyers are “prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of
harm before it occurs.”324
Ideally, courts should recognize that a prophylactic rule prohibiting
off-label promotion is necessary. Some of the problems associated with
in-person solicitation by lawyers resonate with off-label promotion
through detailing. The face-to-face nature of the communication by
detailers is a one-sided presentation, not visible to public scrutiny that
may lead to uninformed, or at least misinformed, decisionmaking. In
Caronia, the court assumed that information about off-label use, provided
to prescribing physicians “can save lives” because it provides a basis for
“intelligent and well-informed” decisions.325 This assumption, however,
fails to account for the very nature and purpose of detailing. Because
conversations between sales representatives and doctors take place largely
in private, they are difficult to monitor and thus it is impossible to know the
extent to which information is truthful or misleading.326 Although
economic incentives certainly do not remove off-label promotion from First
Amendment protection, the reliability of the information must be
considered in the context of a sales force incentivized to sell for off-label
use and a company intent on avoiding the costly FDA approval process.327

The Court had previously held that states could not prohibit truthful advertising about
legal services because it impermissibly inhibited the free flow of commercial information
under the First Amendment. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
The Court found that advertising by lawyers is not inherently misleading, but recognized
that there that might be some advertisements that would be misleading “because the
public lacks sophistication concerning legal services.” Id. at 383. In particular, the Court
noted that advertisements that “are not susceptible of measurement or verification,” such as
claims about the quality of services provided or in-person solicitations, “may be so likely
to be misleading as to warrant restriction.” Id. at 383–84.
322. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
323. Id. at 457.
324. Id. at 464.
325. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 2012).
326. See Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label
Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 N. ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558 (2009), available at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/michelle-mello/files/2012/09/Off-label_PDF.pdf.
327. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
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Furthermore, prohibitions on off-label promotion seek to prevent harm
before it occurs, by insuring that drugs are properly tested for safety and
efficacy.
Although these factors should persuade courts of the dangers of offlabel promotion and the necessity of restrictions, the U.S. Supreme
Court, with the exception of the Ohralik decision, has been hostile to
“prophylactic” rules.328 Moreover, in Ohralik, the Court emphasized the
vulnerability of distressed potential clients.329 By contrast, courts have
viewed doctors, the targets of detailing, as sophisticated customers.330
Though there are meritorious arguments about the lack of sophistication
of doctors in response to detailing, as well as the training of detailers in
the art of persuasion, such arguments require educating the courts about
how detailing impacts the prescribing habits of doctors to the detriment
of the public health.331
A stronger argument for restricting off-label promotion through detailing
is that statements made by detailers about off-label use are not by their
very nature subject to verification. Several statements by the Supreme
Court indicate that information that cannot be verified is inherently
misleading. In the context of legal advertising, the Court recognized the
danger of statements that are not verifiable, stating that “the indeterminacy
of statements about law makes it impractical if not impossible to weed
out accurate statements from those that are false or misleading.”332 The
Court has also stated that “[r]egulations that suppress the truth are no
less troubling because they target objectively verifiable information.”333
Information about the safety and efficacy of off-label uses is not verifiable
in any scientific way.
Judge Kozinski, a proponent of eliminating the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech, has recognized that “listeners
are far less likely to be misled about matters they can check out by reference
to objective facts than about such intangibles as the leadership qualities

328. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993). In Edenfield, the Court
held that a state ban on personal solicitation by Certified Public Accountants was
unconstitutional. Id. The Court did not find the risks associated with in-person solicitation by
attorneys were present in cases involving CPAs. The Court stated, “Broad prophylactic
rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” Id. (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
329. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465–66.
330. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
331. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
332. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 644 (1985).
333. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996).
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of a political candidate or the divine inspiration of a television
evangelist.”334 Judge Kozinski stated:
[M]uch scientific expression can easily be labeled true or false, but we would be
shocked at the suggestion that it is therefore entitled to a lesser degree of
protection. If you want, you can proclaim that the sun revolves around the
earth, that the earth is flat, that there is no such thing as nitrogen, that flounder
smoke cigars, that you have fused atomic nuclei in your bathtub—you can spout
any nonsense you want, and the government can’t stop you.335

The argument that detailers’ speech about off-label use is protected
under the First Amendment as scientific opinion is easily defeated, as the
Harkonen case demonstrated.336 Furthermore, Judge Kozinski’s presumption
that “much scientific expression can easily be labeled true or false”337 is
a matter of degree. The safety and efficacy of a drug for off-label use
cannot be “checked out” by consumers. Even doctors find it difficult to
verify such information as data is uniquely within the control of the
pharmaceutical company.
What is clear from both Western States and IMS Health is the Court’s
concern for the free flow of information and an informed public.338 In
asserting that off-label promotion is false and misleading, the government
must emphasize that the goal of such restrictions is consistent with First
Amendment jurisprudence—to provide accurate information to both
doctors and patients. Although the Court’s decision in IMS Health indicates
that it does not see the practice of detailing in general as problematic,
even when it influences doctors’ prescribing habits, the Court should
recognize that detailing involving off-label promotion carries unique and
substantial risks.339

334. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627, 636–37 (1990) (arguing that there is no basis for the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech in the text or history of the Constitution
and that there is no valid reason for the distinction). But see Christopher P. Guzelian,
Scientific Speech, 93 IOWA L. REV. 881, 910 (2008) (“[C]ommunicators who offer
misleading scientific opinions cannot invariably enjoy First Amendment protection if
those opinions cause recognized legal injuries.”).
335. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 334, at 635.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 303–09.
337. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 334, at 635.
338. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011); Thompson v. W.
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366–67 (2002).
339. See IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
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The argument that promotional information about off-label uses is
inherently misleading is part and parcel of the FDA’s regulatory scheme.
Congressman Henry A. Waxman identified three features of the pre1962 regulatory scheme that caused promotional claims about unproven
uses to be considered inherently misleading:
1) physicians heavily relied on promotional information from manufacturers,
much of which was misleading; 2) existing reliable, objective evidence was difficult
or impossible for average physicians to find because they were too busy to track
down scattered, often unpublished data on hundreds of new drugs; and 3) in the
absence of required testing, few, if any, companies conducted the kind of studies
that would provide reliable evidence of their products’ effectiveness.340

Off-label promotion is precisely the type of “unsubstantiated” promotion
that concerned Waxman. Because doctors may lawfully prescribe offlabel, it is essential for detailers to reach them and evidence shows that
doctors rely on information provided by detailers. It is difficult or
impossible to obtain objective information about off-label use and
effectiveness because the very reason for off-label promotion is often to
avoid the rigorous testing that the FDA requires. One author has wisely
suggested that when manufacturers raise truthfulness as a defense, the
manufacturer should bear the burden of proving the truthfulness of its
off-label claim.341
In Caronia, the court stated that prohibiting off-label promotion
“‘paternalistically’ interferes with the ability of physicians and patients
to receive potentially relevant treatment information.”342 The court also
stated that the public interest is furthered when information that can
“save lives” is provided, including information about off-label use.343 The
court’s view of detailing suggests that pharmaceutical representatives are
educators who provide truthful, nonmisleading information to doctors and
that the risks of influencing prescribing habits are few because physicians
are “sophisticated and experienced customers.”344 Yet the medical literature
reveals that detailing is not designed to educate physicians but rather is
calculated to sell products by influencing doctors’ prescribing habits.345 In

340. Waxman, supra note 1, at 306 (citations omitted).
341. See Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation
of Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 572 (2014).
342. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
343. Id. at 167.
344. Id. at 166 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–71
(2011) (“The fear that physicians, sophisticated and experienced customers, would make
bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot justify content-based burdens on speech.”)).
345. See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Marketing of
Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Complaints, PLOS MED. 2
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describing how detailing works, through the lens of sales representatives
and physicians, the following subparts demonstrate that off-label promotion
is inherently misleading. Allowing off-label promotion guts the FDA’s
premarketing approval system. It introduces unreliable information into
the marketplace of ideas, information that neither doctors nor the public
can access or assess. Because only the detailers themselves and the doctors
they target participate in the conversation, off-label marketing strategies
come to light almost exclusively through information provided by
company insiders or physicians.346
1. How Detailers Mislead Doctors
In IMS Health, the Court stated: “There are divergent views regarding
detailing and the prescription of brand-name drugs. Under the Constitution,
resolution of that debate must result from free and uninhibited
speech.”347 The Court refers to “brand-name drugs” and, presumably, to
detailing for FDA-approved uses, that have been tested for safety and
efficacy. This subpart examines information from doctors and sales
representatives about the impact of detailing and off-label promotion on
medical decisions, demonstrating that “free and uninhibited speech” in
the context of promoting drugs for off-label use leads to decisions based
on marketing rather than scientific evidence, a practice that should
concern courts.
Dr. Jerome P. Kassirer, a Professor at the Tufts University School of
Medicine, finds the idea that sales representatives present truthful,
nonmisleading information to physicians to be highly problematic.348
Dr. Kassirer asserts that “[t]he notion that this is all for physician education
is nonsense” and the fact that companies spend so much money on
advertising is evidence of their intent to influence physicians.349 Several
researchers have concluded that the pharmaceutical industry spends

(Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.
pmed.1000431.
346. See id.
347. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
348. See Marcus Baram, Ex-Drug Sales Rep Tells All, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=4438095&page=1.
349. See id.
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more money on marketing than on research and development.350 In 2000,
pharmaceutical firms reportedly spent a total of $8.5 billion on marketing,
with most of the money financing physician-industry interactions.351
A 2008 report estimated that companies spend as much as $57.5 billion
on advertising, double what they spend on research.352 The importance
of a manufacturer’s detailing sales force is reflected in the fact that it
consumes the largest portion of the marketing budget, a budget that
exceeds that of any other U.S. industry.353 In 2008, pharmaceutical
companies reportedly spent $12 billion on detailing to physicians and
other health care professionals.354 There is some evidence that marketing
to physicians is more profitable than direct-to-consumer advertising because
detailing increases sales for the particular brand of drug promoted, rather
than raising awareness or creating demand across brands, as directto-consumer advertising tends to do.355
The industry’s faith in detailing is evident in the growth of the number
of drug representatives in the United States.356 Between 1995 and 2005,

350. See, e.g., Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of
Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 785, 785 (2005).
351. See Alice LaPlante, Marketing Directly to Physicians Reaps Higher Returns
for Drug Companies, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS. (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.gsb.stanford.
edu/news/research/mktg_narayanan_pharmaceuticals.shtml.
352. See Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New
Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, PLOS MED.
32 (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2
F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0050001&representation=PDF. The pharmaceutical industry
disputes such figures, maintaining that it spends more on research and development than
on all combined promotional activities. See PHRMA, THE FACTS ABOUT PHARMACEUTICAL
MARKETING & PROMOTION 17–18 (2008), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/
files/pdf/marketing_and_promotion_facts_071108_final.pdf.
353. Manchanda & Honka, supra note 350, at 785 (citing DICK R. WITTINK, ANALYSIS OF
ROI FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PROMOTION (ARPP) (2002), available at http://www.rxpromoroi.
org/ar’pp/media/arpphandout0927.pdf).
354. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 2
(2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10522/
12-02-drugpromo_brief.pdf.
355. See LaPlante, supra note 351; Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical
Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 373 (2000).
356. See Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA Regulate
the Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 309, 309–16 (1992). In Bad Pharma, Dr. Ben Goldacre states that:
the overwhelming majority of the industry’s promotional budget goes on
influencing doctors, rather than patients, and about half of that gets spent on
drug reps. They are not cheap, and though their numbers fluctuate, they have
doubled in the past two decades, with one rep for every three to six doctors,
depending on how you measure it.
GOLDACRE, supra note 282, at 274 (footnotes omitted).
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the number of pharmaceutical sales representatives increased from 38,000
to 100,000.357 Studies suggest that this number would furnish one sales
representative for every six physicians, but that the actual ratio is closer
to one sales representative per 2.5 doctors because not all physicians
practice and physicians who are unlikely to change their prescribing habits
are not detailed.358 Researchers have summarized the value of detailers
to doctors as follows:
[T]he concept that reps provide necessary services to physicians and patients is
a fiction. Pharmaceutical companies spend billions of dollars annually to ensure
that physicians most susceptible to marketing prescribe the most expensive, most
promoted drugs to the most people possible. The foundation of this influence is
a sales force of 100,000 drug reps that provides rationed doses of samples, gifts,
services, and flattery to a subset of physicians. If detailing were an educational
service, it would be provided to all physicians, not just those who affect market
share.359

Although the Court’s decision in IMS Health suggests that it is not
perturbed by the influence that detailing has on doctors’ prescribing
habits,360 the Court should recognize the unique role that detailing plays
in off-label promotion. Detailing is particularly important in off-label
promotion because doctors are allowed to prescribe for off-label uses.
Abbott Laboratories’ off-label promotion of its drug Depakote provides
an example of the important role that detailing plays.361 The company
admitted that for eight years it had a sales force dedicated to marketing
Depakote for off-label uses.362 The drug was FDA-approved for use with
epileptic seizures, bipolar mania, and migraines, but was marketed to
357. Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps
Make Friends and Influence Doctors, PLOS MED. 624 (Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.
plosmedicine.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed
.0040150&representation=PDF.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 625.
360. In IMS Health, the Court noted that the Vermont legislature had concluded
that the information the pharmaceutical marketers provide to doctors is incomplete and
unbiased. Furthermore, the legislature concluded that doctors rely on this information
because they do not have time to research the constant advances in drugs. Nevertheless,
the Court spoke with seeming approval of the detailing as “an expensive undertaking”
and recognized that detailers can be more effective when they know a physician’s prescribing
practices. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660–61 (2011).
361. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Abbott Labs To Pay $1.5 Billion To
Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations of Off-Label Promotion of Depakote (May 7,
2012), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-civ-585.html.
362. See id.
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nursing homes to treat symptoms of dementia in elderly patients.363
There was no scientific evidence that the drug was effective in controlling
dementia.364 Furthermore, even as Abbott began its off-label campaign,
it had halted a trial for treating dementia because of side effects such as
dehydration and anorexia.365 The company pled guilty and agreed to pay
$1.5 billion for misbranding the drug.366 Even without evidence of the
drug’s safety or efficacy in treating particular conditions, the sales force,
through detailing, was able to convince doctors to prescribe it for these uses.
In assessing speech related to pharmaceutical promotional activities,
courts have emphasized that information is power and that manufacturers
are in the best position to provide relevant information.367 This argument,
however, overstates the scientific expertise of sales representatives and
gives insufficient weight to the pressures on sales representatives to sell.
The information that sales representatives provide is more likely to be
biased than truthful. They are trained to emphasize the benefits of their
product, to suppress any negative information about their product, and to
highlight negative aspects of a competitor’s product.368 Thus, although
manufacturers are in a unique position to provide information to the
medical community, they are more likely to control the information in a
manner that best advances sales.369
Detailers are trained to target doctors most susceptible to marketing
efforts and to develop a relationship with them.370 To ensure detailers
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2012).
368. See Michael A. Steinman & Dean Schillinger, Drug Detailing in Academic
Medical Centers: Regulating for the Right Reasons, with the Right Evidence, at the Right
Time, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 21, 23 (2010); see also Baram, supra note 348 (“To sell their
drugs, pharmaceutical companies . . . exaggerate the drug’s benefits and underplay their
side-effects . . . .”); Letter from Shahram Ahari, Former Eli Lilly Pharm. Sales Representative,
to Congress (March 2008), available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/ media/doc/hr190
sa.pdf (explaining that drug representatives were trained to downplay side effects of a drug).
369. Peter Doshi and Tom Jefferson raise a related issue about manufacturers’
control of information in Drug Data Shouldn’t Be Secret, N.Y. TIMES (April 10, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/opinion/drug-data-shouldnt-be-secret.html?_r=0.
The authors criticize the drug manufacturer, Roche, for failing to release to the research
community most of the clinical trial data that would support claims about the antiinfluenza drug Tamiflu. Id. They note that the FDA-approved Tamiflu to treat flu symptoms
but did not reach conclusions about Tamiflu’s ability to reduce hospitalization stays and
serious complications. Id. The authors suggest that literature, including peer-reviewed
articles, touting the “assumed properties” of the drug, rely solely on information
published by Roche. Id. More than $1.5 billion of taxpayer money was devoted to
stockpiling the drug without any evidence of the drug’s effectiveness. Id.
370. See Ahari, supra note 368.

698

[VOL. 51: 645, 2014]

Off-Label Promotion
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

will connect socially with doctors, job qualifications are more likely to
include an outgoing personality and keen observation skills than an
education or training in science.371 A former drug representative for Eli
Lilly described drug representatives as “young and attractive” and
“eloquent and convincing,” but lacking in “any significant scientific
understanding.”372 He also stated that representatives usually change
jobs relatively quickly as enthusiasm about the product diminishes, and
that they are “easily replaced by other, younger, less questioning recruits.”373
Sales representatives are tasked with identifying doctors who are
likely to change their prescribing habits and finding ways to make them
do so. They develop profiles of doctor that will help them create a social
relationship to increase influence.374 Detailers may bestow free samples,
invitations to speak at various events, dinners, and expense-paid trips to
doctors who write large numbers of prescriptions.375 Even small gifts
such as pens bearing the company’s logo are effective in developing
“reciprocity,” the term well-known in psychology and marketing for
creating an obligation, whether conscious or subconscious, to return a
favor.376 Dr. Ben Goldacre summarizes how a drug company perceives
a doctor’s prescribing decisions:
You want the doctor to prescribe your product, and you will do everything you
can to make that happen. You might dress this up as “raising awareness of our
product,” or “helping doctors make decisions,” but the reality is, you want sales.
So you will advertise your new treatment in medical journals, stating the
benefits but downplaying the risks, and leaning away from unflattering
comparisons. You will send out “drug reps” to meet doctors individually, and

371. See id.
372. See id. Ahari testified that in the training class for the “elite neuroscience
division” at Eli Lilly, none of his twenty-one classmates had college level scientific education.
Id.
373. Id.
374. See GOLDACRE, supra note 282, at 277–79.
375. Shane M. Ward, WLF and the Two Click Rule: The First Amendment Inequity
of the Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Off-Label Drug Use Information
on the Internet, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 41, 47–48 (2001).
376. See ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF INFLUENCE AND
RECIPROCITY: A SYMPOSIUM 1 (2007), available at https://members.aamc.org/eweb/upload/
The%20Scientific%20Basis%20of%20Influence.pdf; see also GOLDACRE, supra note
282, at 281 (footnote omitted) (stating that social science research shows that “doctors
develop an unconscious sense of obligation, a debt to be repaid, especially when stronger
relationships are built through social events”).
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talk up the merits of your treatment. They will offer gifts, lunches, and forge
personal relationships that may be mutually beneficial later.377

Most people would assume, as the court did in Caronia, that doctors
can readily distinguish sales pitches from reliable scientific data. The
next subpart explores how doctors, many of whom believe they are
impervious to sales pitches and token gifts, are influenced by such tactics
in a manner that jeopardizes the public health.
2. Doctors Are Not “Sophisticated and Experienced Customers” Able
To Distinguish Between Valid and Misleading Information
Courts have largely assumed that doctors are capable of distinguishing
valuable, scientific information from misleading claims about pharmaceutical
products.378 Thus, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, the court
rejected the argument that the government had an interest in ensuring
that physicians receive a balanced flow of information.379 The court
stated that “[t]he government, however benign its motivations, simply
cannot justify a restriction of truthful nonmisleading speech on the
paternalistic assumption that such restriction is necessary to protect the
listener from ignorantly or inadvertently misusing the information,”
especially when the “recipient of information is a sophisticated listener
trained extensively in the use of such information—as are the doctors
and other health care providers in this case.”380 Similarly, in United States
v. Caputo, the district court stated that it could not find off-label promotion
to be inherently misleading because physicians are a sophisticated
audience, and are able to “independently evaluate the validity of [sales
representatives’] claims.”381 In IMS Health, the Court referred to prescribing
physicians as “‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.”382 In Caronia,
the court echoed that language.383
The conclusions that courts have made about doctors’ ability to
discern valuable from misleading information is hard to understand because
the reasons for current restrictions on promotion were extensively addressed
377. GOLDACRE, supra note 282, at 244.
378. See United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(“Defendants’ speech was directed at physicians who are familiar with the FDAapproval process and able to independently evaluate the validity of their claims. Given
the sophistication of the audience to whom the off-label uses were promoted, this Court
cannot conclude . . . that Defendants’ speech was inherently misleading.”).
379. See Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 1999).
380. Id.
381. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
382. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (quoting Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993)).
383. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
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in the hearings that led to the legislation. When the FDCA was substantially
revised in 1962, the amendments addressed concerns that doctors could
not adequately evaluate frequently misleading claims made by drug
manufacturers.384 This concern should be underscored when offlabel promotion is considered, as off-label products have not been proven
safe or effective for the intended use.
One reason that doctors are not the sophisticated audience that courts
and patients imagine them to be is the unyielding pressure on their time.
Practicing physicians rely on information from pharmaceutical
representatives because they have little time to assess new products
independently.385 One author states that doctors “can examine only a
tiny sliver of the findings and minutiae published in journals concerning
just their own specialty, and most read only summaries of most articles
that they hear about.”386 Dr. Jerome Groopman, author of How Doctors
Think, explains that most doctors learn about new products from the
pharmaceutical industry and that it is rare for doctors to read in depth
about new drugs.387 Another doctor explains that an expert in the field
would not need the information that a drug representative provides; the
doctor who needs information, however, is “hard-pressed to contextualize

384. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 301–11. Waxman describes the difficulty that
doctors have in assessing the information provided by drug companies:
[I]t was impossible for physicians to ascertain which drugs were effective for
their claimed uses because of the large number of drugs being introduced,
misleading advertising, the absence of adequate effectiveness testing, the fact
that the evidence, if there was any, was either unpublished or scattered through
hundreds of medical journals, and the lack of time and training most physicians
have to devote to the study of detailed clinical reports.
Id. at 303 (citing S. REP. NO. 87-1744, at 37 (1962)); see also Alan H. Kaplan, Fifty
Years of Drug Amendments Revisited: In Easy-To-Swallow Capsule Form, 50 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 179, 185–86 (1995) (purporting that the amendments of 1962 addressed the
false representation issue by mandating inclusion of information in advertisements and
printed descriptions).
385. See, e.g., Howard Brody, The Company We Keep: Why Physicians Should
Refuse To See Pharmaceutical Representatives, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED. 82, 83–84 (2005);
Melinda L. Randall et al., Attitudes and Behaviors of Psychiatry Residents Toward
Pharmaceutical Representatives Before and After an Educational Intervention, 29 ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY 33, 35–36 (2005).
386. Mossman & Steinberg, supra note 375, at 266, 316; see also David T. Burke
et al., Reading Habits of Practicing Physiatrists, 81 AM J. PHYS. MED. & REHAB. 779,
779 (2002) (noting that “most physiatrists only scan the table of contents and read the
most important abstracts”).
387. See JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 221 (2007).
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the information being presented, or even simply to distinguish true from
false information.”388 Thus, courts should not assume that doctors have
the time or the inclination to assess and verify information from
pharmaceutical representatives.
The efforts of detailers, coupled with doctors’ reliance on information
from drug representatives, leads to changes in prescribing habits.389 One
study considered the impact of commercial channels, including
advertisements and detailing as well as scientific sources of information,
such as published reports of clinical trials and review articles.390 The
study examined doctors’ habits and beliefs regarding the efficacy of
drugs about which the messages in scientific sources were very different
than in commercial sources. 391 In fact, the study reported that
advertisements for one of the drugs studied was the primary source of
misinformation about the drugs’ efficacy.392 The study concluded that
physicians were more influenced by commercial than scientific sources,
but they were either unaware or unwilling to report that they were so
influenced.393 Detailing and salesmanship play dominant roles in physicians’
choices about treatment. 394 Reports by the American Association of

388. See Steinman & Schillinger, supra note 368, at 22.
389. While detailing may be the most common type of off-label promotion, the
practice may be one part of a more extensive off-label marketing strategy. Companies
may use a combination of tactics to promote off-label uses. In combination, these tactics
give the appearance to physicians that the off-label use has been accepted or gained
traction in the medical community. Creating physician advisory boards and convincing
prominent physicians to serve as “thought leaders” to influence colleagues to use a product
off-label are tactics that physicians may not recognize as commercially influenced.
Drug companies have also hired communication companies that get articles published in
medical journals. See supra text accompanying notes 38–47 (discussing the Neurontin
case); see also Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is
Shaped Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, PLOS MED. 1431 (Sept. 25,
2007), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2F
journal.prmed.0040286&representation=PDF (noting that “medical journals have real effects upon
physician prescribing behavior, which is why pharmaceutical companies invest so much in
their publication”). Even peer-reviewed, double-blind studies published in prestigious
medical journals can spread faulty information when drug companies manipulate the results.
See Richard Smith, Medical Journals Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical
Companies, PLOS MED. 365 (May 17, 2005), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/fetch
Object.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0020138& representation=PDF.
390. See Jerry Avorn et al., Scientific Versus Commercial Sources of Influence on
the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4 (1982).
391. See id. at 4–6.
392. See id. at 5.
393. See id. at 6–7.
394. See, e.g., Puneet Manchanda & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Responsiveness of
Physician Prescription Behavior to Salesforce Effort: An Individual Level Analysis, 15
MARKETING LETTERS 129, 138 (2004) (finding that pharmaceutical detailing impacts
prescribing behavior); Natalie Mizik & Robert Jacobson, Are Physicians “Easy
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Medical Colleges recognize that pharmaceutical marketing impacts the
objective judgment of physicians to act in their patients’ best interests.395
Furthermore, studies conclude that the impact of marketing such as
detailing creates a “net harm” to patients because doctors may be influenced
to prescribe newer, more expensive drugs when a less expensive drug
that may be more efficacious and safer is available; physicians may
prescribe a drug when lifestyle changes or other nondrug therapies might
be preferable; physicians may prescribe drugs when none are really
required; and finally, the public trust may be tested by the perception of
collusion between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry.396
Not surprisingly, most doctors believe they are immune from sales
pitches by drug representatives.397 One doctor stated, “You don’t really
think I would let a pizza lunch influence my decision-making process for
my patients, do you?”398 Doctors who believe that they are personally
immune from commercial messages, however, believe their colleagues
are influenced by commercial channels.399
With substantial evidence that detailers are trained to sell rather than
to educate doctors, and that doctors do not have the time or the ability to
distinguish truthful from misleading information provided by pharmaceutical
representatives, the potential for harm is evident. The industry targets
doctors who are likely to respond to overtures by changing their prescribing
habits; the industry also selects the information about the product that is
likely to produce a sale. The manufacturer has unique control over the
information. The strategies of the pharmaceutical industry are not balanced
by the physician’s expertise and training. Rather, physicians unwittingly
rely on the information provided without the time or resources to verify
the information. Thus, the safeguards that the courts have assumed will
protect consumers from misleading information do not exist.

Marks”?: Quantifying the Effects of Detailing and Sampling on New Prescriptions, 50
MGMT. SCI. 1704, 1714 (2004) (finding that past detailing affects current prescribing
habits); Mossman & Steinberg, supra note 375, at 314–15; see also Manchanda & Honka,
supra note 350, at 787 (“[D]etailing . . . affects physician prescription behavior in a positive
and significant manner.”).
395. See, e.g., ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., INDUSTRY FUNDING OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION: REPORT OF AN AAMC TASK FORCE 6 (2008), available at https://members.
aamc.org/eweb/upload/Industry%20Funding%20of%20Medical%20Education.pdf.
396. See Steinman & Schillinger, supra note 368, at 21–23.
397. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., supra note 376, at 7–8.
398. Id.
399. See GOLDACRE, supra note 282, at 274–75.
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Although a blanket prohibition against off-label promotion would be
more beneficial to the medical community and the safety of the public,
pharmaceutical companies are likely to argue that even misleading
information about off-label uses involves some truthful information.
The Supreme Court has stated that when “truthful and nonmisleading
expression will be snared along with fraudulent or deceptive commercial
speech, the State must satisfy the remainder of the Central Hudson test
by demonstrating that its restriction serves a substantial state interest and
is designed in a reasonable way to accomplish that end.”400 Thus, there
is the potential to bring even cases involving fraudulent and deceptive
speech back into the morass of heightened or intermediate scrutiny.
V. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY AND CENTRAL HUDSON ANALYSIS
OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION
The debate about off-label promotion and the First Amendment has
come at a time when the Court seems intent on broadening protection for
commercial speech or even eliminating the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech.401 It is unclear from the Court’s discussion
in IMS Health whether the Court is moving away from the Central
Hudson analysis of commercial speech. The Court appears to offer two
different standards for commercial speech. First, the traditional Central
Hudson analysis, albeit with a more “unforgiving brand of intermediate
scrutiny,” and a second standard of “heightened scrutiny,” which is
unfamiliar in the commercial speech context.402 Although these new
methods of analysis make it more difficult to justify commercial speech,
restrictions on off-label promotion should still withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
Heightened scrutiny should not apply to restrictions on off-label
promotion. In IMS Health, the Court stated that the “First Amendment

400. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993).
401. Commercial speech received no protection until 1976. In Valentine v.
Chrestensen, the Court held that the First Amendment does not protect commercial
speech involving promoting a product for sale. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). The Court
overruled Valentine in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976). The Court held that if it is lawful to sell a
product, it must be lawful to inform consumers that the product is available to buy. Id. at
773. The Court developed protection of commercial speech in several cases. See, e.g.,
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195–96 (1999);
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 76 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). For a history on the development
of the commercial speech doctrine, see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 334.
402. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2679 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(advocating against the application of heightened scrutiny).
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requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a regulation
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’”403 In
that case, the Court found that the purpose of the law was “viewpoint
discriminatory.”404 Such analysis, however, does not hold up in the
context of off-label promotion. Off-label promotion is prohibited not to
further any favored point of view, but to insure that doctors and consumers
receive accurate information. The premarket approval process insures
that accuracy of information. Of course, the government seeks to enforce
its premarket approval process and to discourage efforts to bypass it. To
suggest that an agency seeking to uphold its own system is viewpoint
discriminatory simply makes no sense. In Caronia, the court applied the
heightened scrutiny test mechanically and conclusively, without any
convincing analysis of why a prohibition on off-label promotion is
viewpoint discriminatory.405 The court merely concluded that the goal
and impact of the restriction was to decrease off-label drug marketing.406
In his dissent in IMS Health, Justice Breyer pointed out that in highly
regulated industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, rules “necessarily
draw distinctions on the basis of content” and are “speaker-based” because
they apply to the regulated firms.407 Breyer used off-label promotion as an
example. According to Breyer, the FDA controls
in detail just what a pharmaceutical firm can, and cannot, tell potential purchasers
about its products. Such a firm, for example, could not suggest to a potential
purchaser (say, a doctor) that he or she might put a pharmaceutical drug to an
“off label” use, even if the manufacturer, in good faith and with considerable
evidence, believes the drug will help. All the while, a third party (say, a researcher)
is free to tell a doctor not use the drug for that purpose.408

Restrictions on off-label promotion should also survive Central
Hudson analysis. Courts have readily acknowledged the government’s
interests in protecting the public health by insuring that drugs are safe

403. Id. at 2664 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
404. See id. at 2663.
405. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2012).
406. See id. at 165.
407. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2677–78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
408. Id. at 2678. In IMS Health, Breyer maintained that applying heightened scrutiny to
commercial speech “opens a Pandora’s Box of First Amendment challenges to many
ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally affect a commercial message. . . . [I]t
reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic
decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.” Id. at 2685.
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and effective.409 Courts should also conclude that prohibiting off-label
promotion directly advances that interest. In Washington Legal Foundation
v. Friedman, for example, the court found that restricting off-label
promotion is “one of the few mechanisms available to FDA to compel
manufacturer behavior.”410 In Caronia, the court erroneously concluded
that the restriction did not directly advance the government’s interest
because off-label use is lawful.411 In doing so, the court did not give
adequate consideration to the distinction between off-label prescribing
and off-label promotion.412 Off-label prescribing allows doctors to make
scientifically sound medical decisions about individual patients,413 giving
them the option to prescribe off-label when patients need a treatment
that is not yet available or not proven effective for the off-label use.414
The FDA recognizes that off-label uses may be valuable and seeks to
avoid intrusion on the discretionary decisions of healthcare professionals.415
Off-label marketing encourages prescribing decisions based on unreliable and
one-sided information that is scripted for pharmaceutical representatives
in an effort to reach new lucrative markets without the time, money, and
risks involved in the FDA approval process, and without reliable scientific
knowledge about the safety or efficacy of the product for the use
promoted. Thus, courts should not follow the reasoning in Caronia
and should conclude that restricting off-label promotion directly
advances the government’s interesting in insuring that drugs are safe and
effective.
Courts should also find that restrictions against off-label promotion
meet the final prong of Central Hudson because there is a reasonable fit
between the restrictions and the government’s interests, and because
409. See, e.g., Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“[O]ne of the [FDCA’s] core objectives is to
ensure that any product regulated by the FDA is ‘safe’ and ‘effective’ for its intended use.”).
410. 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated in part sub nom. Washington
Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 336–37 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
411. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166.
412. Even as doctors recognize the benefits of some off-label prescriptions, questions
have increasingly arisen regarding the scientific rationale for some off-label uses. See,
e.g., Becky A. Briesacher et al., The Quality of Antipsychotic Drug Prescribing in
Nursing Homes, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1280, 1280 (2005) (more than onefourth of nursing home residents received antipsychotic medications, many of which
were off-label, exceeded dosage guidelines, or both).
413. See GROOPMAN, supra note 387, at 218.
414. See Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding Awkward Alchemy—In the Off-Label Drug
Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent Research Should Not Transmogrify
into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product Manufacturers Distribute It, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 971 (1999) (explaining that off-label prescribing is particularly
important in certain specialties, such as cancer treatment and pediatric medicine).
415. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
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there are no other reasonable alternatives. In Caronia, the court found
that regulations prohibiting off-label promotion did not meet this test
because they were not sufficiently narrowly drawn.416 The court then
proceeded to list several other methods the government might employ to
better regulate off-label promotion.417
In suggesting alternative methods of regulating off-label, the court
ignored the fact that restrictions on off-label promotion were crafted to
address real abuses and that several of its suggestions had already been
tried and proven ineffective. Representative Henry A. Waxman, who
has consistently championed the need for restricting off-label promotion
by pharmaceutical companies, explained that congressional documents
and hearings have consistently demonstrated that disclaimers and
postmarket actions do not work. In support of limiting promotion of
unapproved drugs, Waxman wrote:
There . . . was abundant evidence to support the conclusion that alternatives,
such as disclaimers disclosing the state of the evidence supporting a claim, and
postmarket enforcement actions, were inadequate to stop deceptive and
dangerous products. The record revealed that when there is no requirement to
conduct the tests necessary to establish safety and effectiveness, such tests
rarely are conducted. Disclaimers cannot in any way address the grave harm to
patients caused by a marketplace in which no one is sure which products work
and which do not: many patients are denied effective treatment while others risk
serious side effects without any benefit that would justify the risk.418

Postmarket enforcement takes months or even years, during which time a
drug remains on the market, exposing patients to dangerous or ineffective
treatment. Evidence shows that disclaimers have a limited impact on
physicians, and that consumers frequently misinterpret or ignore them.419
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the government may face challenges in prosecuting
pharmaceutical companies for off-label promotion, it should not be
deterred by the Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia. The government
has at least two options in pursuing pharmaceutical companies for offlabel promotion. First, emphasizing that a defendant is being prosecuted

416.
417.
418.
419.

United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2012).
See id. at 168; supra note 225.
Waxman, supra note 1, at 300.
See Kesselheim, supra note 28, at 250–51.
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for his intent to misbrand rather than for promotion itself might be
enough to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Second, prosecutors should
focus increasingly on the false or misleading nature of off-label promotion
to take the legal analysis outside of the scope of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, sound arguments distinguish the oral promotional
statements by pharmaceutical representatives from the speech the U.S.
Supreme Court found constitutionally protected in Western States and
IMS Health. Prohibitions on off-label promotion are not subject to the
heightened scrutiny standard the Court employed in IMS Health because
the restrictions do not express any particular point of view; they merely
seek to uphold the regulatory scheme that protects the public by requiring
scientific testing of drugs for safety and efficacy. These restrictions
easily satisfy the Central Hudson test because they directly advance the
government’s substantial interest in protecting the public health through
the FDA’s premarket approval process in a manner that is effective and
no more restrictive than necessary.
Courts should be more sensitive to the fact that restrictions on offlabel promotion were based on years of experience and evidence about
the abuses and harms associated with off-label promotion. Caronia is
but the latest in several attempts by the pharmaceutical industry to
loosen restrictions on off-label promotion. The power of the industry to
dismantle legislation designed to give the public accurate information and
protect the public from misleading and biased information is disheartening.
The government should continue to investigate and prosecute companies
and individuals who strategically mislead doctors and the public into
prescribing, purchasing, and using drugs that have not been scientifically
proven safe and effective for a particular use.
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